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Institutional investors have increasingly engaged in corporate
governance activities, introducing proxy proposals and negotiating with
management, with a goal of improving corporate performance. As
shareholder activism has increased, financial economists have sought to
measure its effect on performance. This Article reviews the corporate
finance literature on institutional investors' activities in corporate
governance and uses the findings of the empirical literature to inform
normative recommendations for the proxy process. In brief, there is an
apparent paradox: notwithstanding the development of shareholder
activism and commentators' generally positive assessments of it, the
empirical research indicates that such activism has little or no effect on
targetedfirms' performance. This implies that activist institutions ought to
reassess their agendas, in order to use their resources more effectively.
The Article takes a two-pronged approach to furthering this aim. First, it
suggests a mechanism ofinternal control, whereby funds would engage in
periodic review of their shareholder-activism programs to identifY the
most fruitful governance objectives. Second, it seeks ways to provide
incentives to undertake such internal reevaluations, advocating
elimination or significant reduction ofthe subsidy ofproposal sponsorship
under the SEC rules unless a proposal achieves substantial voting support
or permittingfirms' shareholders to choose what level ofsubsidy they wish
to provide to proposal sponsors. The estimated savings from eliminating
the subsidy for proposals that fail to receive at least 40% of the votes
ranges from $293 million to $1.9 billion.
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Introduction
Institutional investors have, in the past decade, increasingly engaged
in corporate governance activities, introducing proposals under rule l4a-8,
the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) proxy proposal rule,!
and privately negotiating with management of targeted firms with the
stated goal of improving corporate performance. For example, since the
mid-1980s, institutions have submitted to hundreds of firms shareholder
proposals on corporate governance consisting principally of proposals to
eliminate defensive tactics to takeovers, to adopt confidential proxy
voting, to enhance board independence, and to restrict executive
compensation. Before 1986, only a small set of individual investors
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2000).
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engaged in such activism: from 1979-83, religious groups and six or seven
individuals, depending on the year, submitted more than half of all
proposals, which ranged in the hundreds every year.2 From 1986 until the
early 1990s, five institutions (four public pension funds and the pension
fund of university teachers and administrators) accounted for almost 20%
of all proposals.3 Since 1994, unions have overtaken public pension funds
as the most active corporate governance proposal sponsors.4 More than a
dozen unions and union pension funds, including both national and local-
level organizations, have used the proxy mechanism to sponsor such
proposals.s
Commentators have, in general, commended institutional shareholder
activism, at least in part from a belief that it would replicate the
blockholding-based governance systems of Germany and Japan and
thereby fill the void in managerial monitoring which occurred at the end of
the 1980s with the decline in hostile takeovers in the United States
(although the bloom now is off Germany and Japan's corporate
governance systems given far superior U.S. economic performance for
more than a decade and the increase in hostile takeover activity in recent
years).6 In this view, more active engagement in corporate governance by
institutional investors can substitute for the discipline imposed on
managers by the threat of a hostile takeover.
As shareholder activism on corporate governance matters has become
more pervasive, financial economists have attempted to measure the effect
of such activism on targeted firms' performance. Although the finance
literature focuses, among institutional investors, on proposals by public
pension funds, given the relatively recent appearance of union activism,
because most union proposals are not substantively different from those
sponsored by public pension funds, it is unlikely that the findings would
differ markedly for union proposals. This contention is supported by the
2 Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L.
REv. 425, 438 n.86 (1984).
3 WILLIAM F. SANDER, SHAREHOLDER VOTING ALMANAC 3 (1991) (stating that in 1986,
institutional investors began to assume an active shareholder stance, with five pension funds filing a
"barrage of corporate governance shareholder proposals"); Diane Del Guercio & Jennifer Hawkins,
The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 293,297 (1999) (noting that
CaIPERS, CaISTRS, NYC, SWIB, and CREF sponsored 18% of all corporate governance proposals
submitted in 1987-1993).
4 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder
Proposals?, 73 WASH. L. REv. 41, 51-52 & 51 n.46 (1998) and references cited therein.
5 Id. at 52.
6 E.g., MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 233-53 (1994); Bernard S.
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 811
(1992). One commentator has embraced union corporate governance activism as a mechanism for
achieving organized labor-related goals of worker protection unattainable under a more conventional
labor agenda. Marleen A. O'Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder Activist: Building Coalitions to
Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 V. RICH. L. REv. 1345 (1997).
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fact that, for union proposals involving corporate governance, voting
levels, which are an excellent proxy for the value of a proposal, do not
significantly differ from those obtained for public pension fund proposals
on the same subjects.7
This Article reviews the corporate finance literature on corporate
governance activism involving shareholder proposals and uses it to inform
normative recommendations concerning the proposal process. The finance
literature presents an apparent paradox: notwithstanding commentators'
generally positive assessment of the development of such shareholder
activism, the empiriclj.l studies suggest that it has an insignificant effect on
targeted firms' performance. Very few studies find evidence of a positive
impact, and some even find a significant negative stock price effect from
activism.
There have been two lit~rature reviews, by Jonathan Karpoff and
Bernard Black, that reach the same negative assessment of shareholder
activism's impact, but they have not focused on the gulf between the
empirical and normative literature.8 Jonathan Karpoff seeks to reconcile
the disparate conclusions in finance studies, which he emphasizes are due
7 Thomas & Martin, supra note 4, at 68 (finding no significant difference in voting
outcomes). For a discussion of why voting support is a proxy for the proposal's benefit to shareholders
see text accompanying note 156, infra. The support level is lower, but insignificantly so, when the
sponsoring union is involved in a labor dispute. Thomas & Martin, at 63, 69. It must be noted,
however, that some firms follow a policy of not identifying proposal sponsors in their proxy materials,
including firms with union-sponsored proposals. E.g., Eastman Kodak Proxy (Mar. 13, 1996)
(sponsors not identified, indicates names and addresses will be furnished upon request). The sponsors
of Kodak's 1996 proposals were an individual and the Teamsters Union. IRRC, Checklist of 1996
Shareholder proposals, IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 27 (July-Sept. 1996). Because
Thomas and Martin did not examine only proposals in proxies identifying the proponents for their
analysis but instead used the IRRC data that identifies proposal sponsors, it is possible that union
proposals' support is indistinguishable from other pension funds' proposals' support only when the
voting shareholders do not know the identities of the sponsors. Although Thomas and Martin's
sample's mix of firms identifying and not identifying proposal sponsors is not known because firm
policies on identifying sponsors appear to be random with respect to the proponents' identities, it is
improbable that the results would differ if they had analyzed only proposals whose sponsors were
identified in the proxies. While some recent research indicates that the market response to negotiated
shareholder proposals has changed from positive to negative in the late 1990s, which may well be a
function of the change in identity of the proposal sponsors, N.K. Chidambaran & Tracie Woidtke, The
Role of Negotiations in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Withdrawn Shareholder-Initiated
Proposals (Dec. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation), as
discussed in subsection II.BJ, infra, the market reaction to negotiations is best explained as updating
of information regarding the quality of management, rather than as evidence of the value of a proposal.
8 See Bernard Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United
States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does Shareholder Activism Work? A Survey of Empirical Findings (Apr.
22, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). In addition, Stuart
Gillan and Laura Starks survey all forms of institutional investor activism and not solely shareholder
proposals; they conclude that there is no empirical evidence that such activity improves operating or
long-term market performance, although in theory it is beneficial for large shareholders to become
active monitors of management. See Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, A Survey of Shareholder
Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence, CONTEMPORARY FINANCE DIGEST, Autumn 1998, at
10,3 I.
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to different definitions of what counts as a success and thus are more
apparent than real; his objective is not to explain the gulf between the
finance literature and the legal commentary.9 Bernard Black, who in light
of the empirical finance literature shifted from an optimistic assessment of
institutional investor activism to that of a "pessimist," offers a set of
possible explanations for the overall insignificance of activism: that most
proposals are precatory and are ignored by management; that institutional
investors are unable to organize effectively to influence management or
are uninformed about what issues to propose; and that the overall level of
activism-a small number of institutions spending a trivial amount of
money-is low. 10
The precatory content of shareholder proposals is not sufficient to
explain the insignificant price effects. Management often responds to
precatory proposals, even those receiving less than a majority of the
shares. For instance, of 118 firms adopting confidential voting for the
proxy process, a proposal for confidential voting was offered at only one-
third of the firms, and in only four cases did the proposal receive a
majority of votes, I I It is possible that the market does not react to
shareholder proposals because most proposals do not obtain sufficient
support to evoke a management response, rather than because the proposal
must be couched in precatory language. The reasoning would be that
because shareholder proposals do not obtain a majority of votes, there is
little reason to assume that the management action sought by the
proponent will be adopted, and hence there is nothing to price. However,
the support for proposals has been increasing over time, it is considerable
for specific categories of proposals and, as noted, management may
respond to a proposal that does not obtain majority support. This suggests
that studies should find significant price effects for proposals offered in the
later years of samples in which voting support increased, or at least for the
subsamples of proposals that can be expected to obtain relatively high
voting support and to induce a management response. The lack of
significant positive price effects for such subsamples of proposals, in
conjunction with findings of significant negative price effects in some
studies for some subsamples of proposals, implies that something is at
work other than the explanation that the market assumes proposals will be
ignored by management.
Black's explanation of proposals' insignificant price effects as due to
institutions' inability to organize effectively is also unpersuasive, as the
9 Karpoff, supra note 8, at 1-2.
10 Black, supra note 8, at 463. The recent move to offer proposals that would require
management action is discussed in the text accompanying notes 35-36, infra.
11 See Roberta Romano, Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter? 4, 6 (Nov. 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
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institutional investors who sponsor proposals hold nontrivial blocks in
many firms and have networking organizations on corporate governance
activities that largely mitigate collective action concerns. His alternative
contention that these shareholders have limited information concerning
which proposals are efficacious is consistent with this Article's
explanation that the apparent paradox is related to the substance of
submitted proposals but it is not the sole explanation of the data-fund
managers might well be informed about which proposals are useful and
still champion fruitless proposals if managers obtain personal benefits
from submitting such proposals, given the absence of strong incentives of
boards of public funds to monitor their staff. The fact that in contrast to
public pension funds, private pension and mutual funds do not engage in
activism has been explained by the competitive nature of the industry, or
more pejoratively, as cost-conscious private funds' free-riding on the
expenditures of activist public funds. 12 I would emphasize a further,
complementary explanation, that such institutions' managers are less likely
to obtain personal (private) benefits from engaging in shareholder activism
than public and union fund managers. 13 Both explanations are supported
by survey data indicating that private fund managers perceive the costs and
benefits of shareholder activism differently from public pension fund
managers.14
Finally Black's explanation that proposals' insignificant price impact
is due to the overall low level of shareholder activism is an incomplete
explanation: it is not institutions' low expenditure level, but rather the
specific objectives of their activism, that have resulted in the absence of a
price effect. ls Even if institutions were to spend more resources on their
proposals in order to ensure voting success, unless the subject of their
proposals was also significantly altered, there would be no change in the
stock price reaction. It is the thesis of this Article that the problem with
shareholder activism is that the governance reforms that institutions are
proposing have no significant cash flow effects.
This Article provides an alternative explanation of the apparent
12 See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARV. BuS.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 140, 144; Black, supra note 8, at 460.
13 See text accompanying notes 17, 181-183 infra (discussing possible private benefits).
14 See GllE R. DOWNES, JR. ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR 32-34 (1999).
15 While the number of institutions engaging in activism is very small (not much more than
a dozen), the number of entities that have engaged in hostile takeovers is not that much greater when
compared to the differential magnitude of the price effects. For example, in 1986, only 40 out of 3,300
takeovers were hostile offers, and that was an all time high, Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their
Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 21, 22, and the premiums in hostile
takeovers are incorporated in the stock price immediately upon the announcement of the bid, often
with significant run-up (averaging 40% of the eventual premium) prior to the announcement, Gregg A.
Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of Tender Offers: Insider
Trading or Market Anticipation?, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225,226-27,244 (1989).
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paradox in the literature that I believe is preferable to Black's conjectures,
because it can rationalize the disparate findings of insignificance and
significance in the empirical studies as well as the finding that
management is often responsive to shareholder activism despite its
precatory form. Namely, financial economists have not been able to
identify a positive performance effect of shareholder activism because
much of that activism is, in fact, misdirected. I reach this conclusion by
relating the studies of shareholder activism to the studies of the underlying
corporate governance devices that are the object of that activity. A review
of that literature makes evident that, for a very large proportion of the
governance structures that are the focus of shareholder activism, such as
independent boards of directors, limits on executive compensation, and
confidential proxy voting, there is a paucity or utter absence of data that
demonstrate that such devices improve performance. Hence, it should not
be surprising that shareholder activism directed at reforming those
governance structures does not produce positive results, and that this result
would persist regardless of proposals' expected voting support.
Negotiated agreements between institutional investors and
management, after which a proposal is withdrawn, on occasion produce
positive price effects. The Article provides an explanation, based on
updating of information on firm quality, of this distinctive result compared
to that for submitted proposals: given that the substantive distributions of
withdrawn and submitted proposals are indistinguishable, the withdrawn
proposal induces a positive price effect because it provides information
about management quality otherwise obscured by the firm's poor
performance (that the managers desire to be responsive to investor
concerns and will not seek to entrench themselves and prevent
shareholders from taking actions, such as accepting a takeover bid, that
improve firm value). A negative price effect is analogously understood as
the response to a negotiation indicating to the market that management's
quality is lower than previously believed. The information-updating
explanation is preferable to a more straightforward value-maximizing
explanation of the empirical results, that when management negotiates
with a shareholder and the proposal is withdrawn it is because it is a value-
maximizing proposal, and when management does not negotiate, it is
because the proposal is not value-maximizing. The value-maximizing
explanation is inconsistent with the studies that find negative price effects
from negotiations. It is also unsatisfactory because there is not sufficient
heterogeneity among proposal targets to explain why the same type of
proposal would be value-maximizing for some firms (where it is
withdrawn) and not others, which would be required by this explanation
given that the empirical results are indistinguishable by proposal type.
The wide gulf between the prior perceptions of commentators and
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pension fund managers and the reality conveyed by the data presents a
perplexing picture: why are time and effort being devoted to fruitless or
marginal activities? This Article does not answer this question directly,
although there is a plausible explanation relating to pursuit of personal
benefits (such as political ambitions or collective bargaining goals) rather
than portfolio firm value-maximization by proposal proponents, who are
not private sector fund managers. There are also data substantiating this
conjecture: the New York City public pension fund manager emphasized
her activism in seeking election to higher office,16 and union funds have
targeted firms where there were ongoing contract negotiations. 17 This
Article takes problematic motivational issues as a given and seeks instead
to recommend devices to provide fund boards in charge of oversight, as
well as fund managers, with more information and incentives to minimize
the effect of agency problems on portfolio performance.
The Article takes a two-pronged approach to the problem of
ineffective shareholder activism. First, the Article recommends adoption of
a mechanism of internal control, something akin to a good management
practice, whereby funds would engage in periodic comprehensive review
of their shareholder-activism programs to identify the most fruitful
governance objectives. Such evaluations would increase information and
thereby improve the quality of decision-making and aid in ensuring that
funds' proxy activities are directed at maximizing portfolio firms' value.
This should increase the benefit from activism to the beneficiaries of the
funds, and is accordingly an appropriate policy from the perspective of the
fiduciary obligations of fund managers. To provide an impetus for
individual compliance, the Article recommends that industry associations
adopt good-practice standards for activism programs that will furnish
guidelines for individual funds. It also suggests the use of independent
third parties, such as public accounting firms, to certify that funds'
activism programs have been thoroughly reviewed.
The Article further advocates changing the SEC proxy proposal rules
to reduce the current subsidy of proposal sponsorship unless a proposal
achieves substantial voting success, or to permit firms to opt out, in whole
or in part, of the current subsidized proposal regime. IS This second reform
16 Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,
93 COLUM. L. REv. 795,822 (1993). In the public pension fund activism article 1 suggested structural
changes to align public fund managers' interests with beneficiaries', and hence I do not pursue that
route here but instead focus on more incremental changes related to addressing the immediate problem,
ineffective use of the shareholder proposal process.
17 Thomas & Martin, supra note 4, at 61-62.
18 Other commentators have advocated repealing rule 14a-8, emphasizing that shareholders
should not have to subsidize a proxy proposal process dominated by individual gadflies whose
proposals obtained at most trivial support. E.g., George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 140-8: A Study in
Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. I (1985) [hereinafter Dent, Study]; Liebeler, supra note 2.
As discussed in section 11I-8 infra, the introduction of institutional investors with higher levels of
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proposal will provide incentives for funds to undertake comprehensive
internal reevaluations of their shareholder proposal programs because
unsuccessful policies (those that do not garner substantial support) will
become more expensive to pursue. For example, the estimated present
value of the cost of the current regime, compared to one of the proposed
reforms, subsidization of only shareholder proposals obtaining 40% of the
votes cast, ranges between $293 million and $1.9 billion. It would also
better track the state-law approach to the reimbursement of expenses of
proxy fights, which are not covered by the SEC shareholder proposal rule,
in which successful challengers can recover their costS.19 In contrast to
shareholder proposals, proxy fights are not typically waged over marginal
matters, and the empirical literature has consistently identified significant
positive wealth effects from this activity.20 No doubt the difference in the
wealth effects of proxy fights and shareholder proposals is a function of
the different incentives created by the cost reimbursement rules: in contrast
to sponsors of shareholder proposals who bear no financial risk, proxy
fight contestants will incur the substantial expense of a contest only where
they expect a victory to produce a significant improvement in corporate
performance.
I. Explaining the Negligible Impact of Shareholder Activism on
Performance
This section reconciles the seeming disparity between the goals of
pension fund activism-shareholder proposals and private negotiations
with management-with the empirical literature that finds that such
activism has, at best, minimal impact on corporate performance. It does so
by relating the empirical research on the effect of pension fund corporate
governance activism on firm performance to the empirical research on the
ownership and whose proposals attain higher support levels does not alter the cost-benefit conclusion,
that subsidizing the proposal process is inefficacious. See also George w. Dent Jr., Proxy Regulation
in Search ofa Propose: A Reply to Professor Ryan, 23 GA. L. REv. 815, 823 (1989) [hereinafter Dent,
Response) (in light of institutional activism, shifting from advocacy in his prior article of the repeal of
rule 14a-8 to suggesting that the SEC require proposal sponsors to post a bond, recoverable if voting
support is "respectable").
19 See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). To
obtain reimbursement, the proxy fight must be over policy and not personal issues, id., but it is not
terribly difficult to characterize personal disputes as policy disagreements.
20 E.g., Lisa F. Borstadt & Thomas J. Zwirlein, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy
Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance, FIN.
MGMT., Autumn 1992, at 22; Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the
Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29 (1989); Peter Dodd & Jerold B.
Wamer, On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, II J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1983); David
Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and
Implications, 66 J. Bus. 405 (1993); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and
Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (1998).
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performance effects of the underlying governance objectives of
shareholder activists. It begins, however, by sketching which firms are
targeted, in order to establish that shareholder proposals should, in fact, be
evaluated by their impact on corporate performance.
A. What firms do institutional investors target?
To ensure that it is appropriate to evaluate the efficacy of institutional
investors' activism by whether there is an impact on corporate
performance, it is necessary to identify which firms activist pension funds
target. Namely, are they targeting poorly performing firms? For if pension
funds' efforts at improving corporate governance are not related to
concerns over corporate performance, then using improvement in
performance as a benchmark for evaluating funds' behavior would be
inappropriate. In particular, we would not expect to find significant
performance effects from shareholder proposals if targeted firms were
among the top-tier performers, for such firms would be less able to
improve their performance significantly. As there may be a number of
firms in a fund's portfolio with subpar performance, in considering the
impact of activism on performance it is also necessary to ascertain whether
funds follow target selection strategies that can be considered rational:
namely, do they select firms for which they have a higher probability of
success, on the assumption that a successful campaign is essential for
performance improvements.
1. Targets of Shareholder Activism are Poor Performers
Several studies find that firms that are the targets of shareholder
activism are, indeed, poor performers (compared to market or industry-
peers) on a variety of stock and accounting measures: abnormal stock
returns, growth in operating income, return on assets, operating return on
sales, sales growth, and market-to-book ratio. 21 However, not all studies
21 See John M. Bizjak & Christopher J. Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and
No Bite? Evidencefrom Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 499 (1998) (market-to-book ratio, growth in operating income); James M. Forjan, The
Wealth Effects ofShareholder-Sponsored Proposals, 8 REv. FIN. ECON. 61, 62 (1999) (stock returns in
the four-and-one-half month period preceding the proposal); Jonathan M. Karpoff et a1., Corporate
Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (1996) (rnarket-to-
book ratio, operating return on sales, sales growth; stock returns only in univariate tests); Deon
Strickland et a1., A Requiemfor the USA: Is Small Shareholder Monitoring Effective?, 40 1. FIN. ECON.
319 (1996) (stock returns); Sunil Wahal, Pension Fund Activism and Firm Performance, 31 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS I (1996) (stock returns, return on assets); Kose John & April Klein,
Shareholder Proposals and Corporate Governance (1995) (unpublished manuscript. on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation) (stock returns, income); Marilyn F. Johnson & Margaret B. Shackell,
Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation (June 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Yale Journal on Regulation) (sales growth); TIM QPLER & JONATHAN SOKOBIN, DOES
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find significant differences on all measures.22 In part, differences among
studies are a function of the selection criteria of the activist institutions.
Since 1988, for instance, the California Public Employees' Retirement
System (CalPERS) has explicitly chosen its targets from among the poor
performers in its portfolio, whereas the Teachers Insurance Annuity
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) uses firms'
corporate governance characteristics rather than a performance criterion.23
Not surprisingly, the one study focusing solely on TIAA-CREF's
initiatives did not find the targets to have been poor performers,z4 But even
TIAA-CREF's objectives are explicitly couched in the ideal of improving
performance,zs The finding of target firms' subpar performance across a
variety of samples of institutional investor activism supports the notion
that the appropriate benchmark for measuring the value of corporate
governance shareholder proposals is their impact upon corporate
performance.
2. Targets Have High Institutional and Low Insider Shareholdings
There are also considerable data that institutional investors select their
targets strategically to increase the probability of success-that is, they
consider the composition of the firm's shareholder voting pool, and not
simply performance, in choosing proposal targets. Several studies find a
negative relation between the receipt of shareholder proposals and insider
ownership, and a positive relation between proposal receipt and
institutional ownership.26 In fact, TIAA-CREF expressly uses institutional
COORDINATED INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVISM WORK? AN ANALYSIS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL
OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, (Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics, Fischer
College of Business, Ohio State Univ. Working Paper No. 95-5, 1995) (stock returns, return on assets).
22 For a comparison across studies see Karpoff, supra note 8, at 20-21.
23 See Willard T. Carleton et aI., The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance
Through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, 53 J. FIN. 1335, 1338-40 (1998)
(describing TIAA-CREF policy); Michael Smith, Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors:
Evidencefrom CalPERS, 51 1. FIN. 227, 232 (1996) (describing CalPERS policy). TIAA-CREF is the
pension fund for university educators at private institutions and some state systems.
24 Carleton et aI., supra note 23, at 1356.
25 TIAA-CREF selects targets by their failure to follow corporate governance procedures
that it has endorsed. !d. at 1339. It believes those procedures improve performance or otherwise
enhance finn value. TIAA-CREF's chainnan and chief executive officer, in explaining its corporate
governance activities, asserted that "sound practices of corporate governance will make a difference in
the future perfonnance of companies." John Biggs, Why TIAA-CREF Is Active in Corporate
Governance, PARTICIPANT, Nov. 1995, at 2. CalPERS is even more explicit concerning its motivation:
"At CalPERS, corporate governance ·is about making money..." Karpoff, supra note 8, at 7, n.2
(quoting CalPERS's 1998 GLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES).
26 See Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 21 (low insider ownership and institutional
manipulation high); Carleton et aI., supra note 23 (low insider ownership and institutional
manipulation high); Karpoff et aI., supra note 2 I (institutional manipulation high); Smith, supra note
23 (institutional manipulation high). A few studies do not find such significant relations. See Karpoff
et aI., supra note 21 (difference in inside ownership insignificant); Smith, supra note 23 (same);
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ownership as a criterion for target selection?7 This strategic behavior is
consistent with the selection of targets for which the probability of success
is high. Insiders, of course, are not expected to vote for proposals
restricting their discretion or otherwise requiring them to establish
governance structures that they have not voluntarily adopted. Institutional
shareholders, who have far greater incentives to engage in informed voting
compared to individual shareholders because of the size and extent of their
holdings, are hypothesized to vote for proposals enhancing shareholders'
ability to monitor management with greater frequency than other outside
investors. And indeed, that is precisely the way such investors vote: the
percentage of votes cast for shareholder proposals is negatively related to
insider ownership and positively related to institutional ownership.28
It is reassuring that studies find a positive correlation between
proposal submission and institutional shareholdings, as it suggests that
pension funds that are corporate governance activists are, in fact,
concerned with the success of their undertakings. But it should be noted
that the studies all involved the targets of public pension fund activism, so
it is not known whether union funds follow a similar strategy.
We can, accordingly, conclude that public pension funds sponsoring
corporate governance proposals are not engaged in symbolic politics, as is
true of sponsors of social responsibility proposals (proposals addressing
social issues and corporate social policy, such as, doing business in
Northern Ireland or animal testing), which receive far more limited support
than corporate governance proposals. For example, in 1994, social
responsibility proposals rarely received more than 20% of the vote while
corporate governance proposals at times received 40%/9 and in 1991-92,
51 of 169 corporate governance proposals received more than 33% of the
Johnson & Shackell, supra note 21 (institutional ownership low). Of these studies, it should be noted,
however, that the Johnson & Shackell study, the only one finding targets have fewer institutional
investors than nontargeted firms, examines solely executive compensation proposals, which, in
contrast to the governance proposals examined in the other studies, tend more commonly to be offered
by individual investors than pension funds. See, e.g., James E. Heard, Executive Compensation:
Perspective ofthe Institutional Investor, 63 U. CrN. L. REv. 749, 758 (1995).
27 Carleton et a!., supra note 23, at 1339. Mark Huson suggests institutional ownership is
also a criterion for CaIPERS. See MARK HUSON, DOES GOVERNANCE MATTER? EVIDENCE FROM
CALPERS INTERVENTIONS 4 (Ins!. for Fin. Research, Faculty of Bus., Univ. of Alberta Working Paper
No. 3-97, July 1997) (finding that firms with low institutional ownership were excluded from
CaIPERS's targeting).
28 Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder
Activism: The Role ofInstitutional Investors, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 275, 295 (2000) (finding that percentage
of votes cast for shareholder proposals is positively related to institutional ownership); Lilli A. Gordon
& John Pound, Information, Ownership Structure. and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from
Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697, 713 (1993) (finding that
percentage of votes cast for shareholder proposals is negatively related to inside ownership and
positively related to high percentages of institutional ownership).
29 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 374 (7th ed. unabr. 1995).
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vote compared to only 1 of 165 social responsibility proposals.3D In
addition, although no social responsibility proposal has ever passed, from
1986-90, 25 corporate governance proposals received a majority of the
votes,3! and the number of corporate governance proposals obtaining a
majority has continued to increase dramatically in the 1990s, with 30
passing in 1999 alone.32
Of course, a proposal's passing does not mean that it will be
adopted-to be submissible under the SEC rules, proposals involving
ordinary business decisions must be precatory because corporate law
delegates such decision-making to the board.33 Although many boards
respond even to unsuccessful proposals, boards can and, on occasion, do
disregard majority votes, particularly on takeover defense rescissions.34
Recent shareholder proposals have sought to prevent the possibility of
such an outcome by phrasing the proposal as a bylaw amendment (which,
if passed, would mandate board action). Whether such a strategy is
permissible has not yet been adjudicated in Delaware, but an Oklahoma
court upheld the inclusion of this type of proposal under the SEC proposal
rules as a proper subject for shareholder action, under a state statute
similar to Delaware's.35 The issue has also been the subject of extensive
commentary, most of which advocates permitting such bylaw proposals, or
some subset of them.36 Notwithstanding the still open question whether an
30 John & Klein, supra note 21, at 16. In the 1980s, social responsibility proposals gained
less than 3% of the votes. Liebeler, supra note 2, at 450-52. Average support for corporate governance
proposals increased throughout the 1980s and for the five highest support categories ranged from
25.8% to 42.1 % by 1990. SANDER, supra note 3 at 5. While social responsibility proposals' support
has also increased, the averages for the two highest support categories were 12.4% and 9.75% in 1990.
See id. at C-2 to C-8 (my calculation). Social responsibility proposals are not a focus of this article
because they are not advanced in order to improve corporate performance and are consequently, not
compatible with the objective of U.S. corporate law, which is to maximize share value.
31 SANDER, supra note 3, at 86.
32 IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN, April-June 1999, at 4 (finding that in 1999,
41 shareholder corporate governance proposals received more than 50% of the votes cast and, based on
the company's voting requirements, 30 of these passed, all but two of which involved elimination of
takeover defenses). The vast majority of firms' annual meetings are held in the first half of the year
(March-May), so the IRRC reports a year's proxy season results in June.
33 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i) (2000). Proposals involving matters that are subject to
shareholder action are submissible in non-precatory form.
34 E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-
Laws: Taking Back the Street?, 73 TuL. L. REv. 409, 421-22 (1998) (describing an example of such
conduct by Fleming Companies, Inc.).
35 Intn'l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Companies, Inc., No. CIV-96-1650-A,
1997 U.S. Oist. LEXIS 2980 (W.O. Okla. Jan 24, 1997). The issue is whether poison pills are a proper
subject for shareholder action (i.e., bylaw amendments) or ordinary business matters that are within the
authority of the board.
36 See. e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Bylaw Battlefield: Can Institutions Change the
Outcome ofCorporate Control Contests, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 605, 613-15 (1997) (suggesting several
"bright line" rules to identify permissible bylaw proposals); Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say Never?"
Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 511, 544-49 (1997) (distinguishing permissible bylaws as those involving
shareholders' residual governance power); Hamermesh, supra note 34, at 425-44, 453, 463-67
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intransigent management can be required to adopt the policies that are the
subject of a successful (majority-supported) shareholder proposal, given
the data on firm targeting, we can conclude that institutional sponsors of
corporate governance proposals are attempting to use their resources
effectively in their choice of targets.
B. What is the Relation Between Activism and Performance?
Shareholder proposals have no significant effect on firm performance,
but private negotiations over proposals in advance of the shareholders'
meeting often have a short-term positive impact, and, on occasion, even a
negative impact. This section reviews and reconciles these seeming
inconsistent data.
1. Studies of Proxy Proposals
Despite the apparent rationality of public pension funds' targeting-
targeted firms tend to be poor performers with a shareholder pool that is
predisposed to vote for corporate governance proposals-there is an
absence of evidence that such activism has any discernible positive impact
on corporate performance. Across the most comprehensive studies of
shareholder proposals, there is a uniform finding of no significant relation
between proposal submissions and target firm performance.3? The studies
(questioning validity and advisability of bylaw proposals); Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and
Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 835, 864-69 (1998) (advocating that
bylaw proposals are valid under state law). A further open question is whether boards can subsequently
repeal shareholder-passed bylaws. For differing positions on this issue see Coffee, supra, at 616-18
(suggesting that a board might be able to repeal such a bylaw but that, by careful crafting, shareholders
can limit a board's ability to do so) and Hamennesh, supra note 34, at 469-75 (maintaining that boards
can amend shareholder-adopted bylaws under Delaware law).
37 See Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3; Gillan & Starks, supra note 28; Karpoff et a\.,
supra note 21; Wahal, supra note 21; Catherine M. Daily et a\., Institutional Investor Activism: Follow
the Leaders? 30 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation).
Because the Daily et a\. study does not provide information on the proposals' content, which is the
focus of this Article's analysis, it is not discussed. When the performance measure is the short-tenn
stock price (abnonnal return) reaction to a particular "event," such as the announcement of submission
of a shareholder proposal or the initiation of negotiation over a proposal, the econometric methodology
used to detennine the perfonnance effect is called an event study. Event studies investigate the impact
of new infonnation upon expected stock returns, which are estimated by an asset pricing model that
most commonly depends on the return on the market; the residual of the linear regression of the stock
return of event firms on the market return during the event interval is the abnormal return or
performance measure due to the event, as it represents the change in stock return beyond the model's
predicted return in the absence of the event. Stephen Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock
Returns: The Case of Event Studies, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1985). Because the power of the tests in
event studies is well-specified for large sample sizes with precise event dates, see, e.g., A. Craig
MacKinlay, Event Studies in Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 13, 30-31 (1997), criteria
which are met in the shareholder activism studies emphasized in this Article, the findings of
insignificance for proxy proposals are not due to imprecision in the event study methodology.
One study found a significant long-tenn positive valuation effect of shareholder activism, see
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are summarized in Table 1. Although the overall conclusion is that
proposals do not affect performance, in each of the comprehensive studies
of shareholder proposals there are subsamples that have significant effects:
the significant positive returns are not related to proposal submission
activity, but the significant negative returns are.
TABLE 1. PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS
ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Study No. No. Sponsors Years Performance
Proposals Firms Effect
Del Guercio 224 125 5 activist funds 1987- insignificant
& Hawkins 93
(1999)
Forjan 798 467 Individuals & 1978- negative
(1999) institutions 91
Gillan & 2,042 452 Individuals & 1987- insignificant
Starks (463) (n.a.) institutions 94
(2000) (institutions)
Karpoff 522 269 Individuals & 1986- insignificant
et al. (1996) institutions 90
Smith 78 51 a CalPERS 1987- insignificant
(1996) 93
Strickland 163 85 United Share- 1992- insignificant
et al. (1996) holders Assn. 93
(USA)
Wahal 306 146 9 activist funds 1987- insignificant
(1996) 93
Note: n.a.- information not available
•39 and 20 for some statistical tests
Sunil Wahal, for example, finds no significant improvement in the
long-term stock or accounting performance in the targets of public pension
fund activism, both for submitted proxy proposals and nonproxy contact
(sending a letter to management expressing concern about performance
without subsequently introducing a proxy proposal).38 But Wahal does find
Aigbe Akhigbe et aI., Long-term Valuation Effects of Sh.areholder Activism, 7 ApPLIED FIN. EeoN.
567, 570 (1997) (144 firms, average abnormal stock returns of 23% by three years after activism). This
study is not included in the table because it combined shareholder proposals with proxy fights. The
study's performance results are driven by the proxy fights in the sample. Although the authors did not
classify their sample by activism form (i.e., individuals seeking a block of board seats are not
differentiated from proposals to add independent directors to the board), they did classify it by activist
type: institutional investor, individual and groups of large shareholders, with the latter two categories
consisting of individuals known for engaging in proxy fights. Id. at 569. They find the individual and
shareholder group variables are positively related to the size of the abnormal return, id. at 572, which
indicates that the significance of their results depends on the proxy fights in the sample.
38 Wahal, supra note 21.
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a significant short-term stock price effect for the nonproxy contacts around
the announcement of their targeting, in contrast to the proxy proposals.
Jonathan Karpoff, Paul Malatesta and Ralph Walkling also find no
significant stock price reaction to proxy proposals and no operating
performance improvements over one to three years following the
shareholder proposal (for all firms and for the subset of firms where the
proposal was offered by CaIPERS).39 But for a subset of proposals-those
involving executive compensation-the stock price reaction to the
proposal was significantly negative. However, a multivariate regression
did not confirm a significant difference between compensation-related and
other proposals.40
Stuart Gillan and Laura Starks similarly find no significant stock
price reaction to proxy proposals offered by institutional investors, but a
significant negative stock price reaction to the subset of proposals seeking
rescission of poison pills that are sponsored by institutional investors.41
Diane Del Guercio and Jennifer Hawkins also find no significant stock
price effect from proxy proposals around the announcement date or in the
long term (measured over three years after the proposal) and no significant
improvements in long-term operating performance.42 In addition, in
contrast to Wahal, they do not find any difference in announcement date
returns when their sample is divided into proxy proposals and negotiated
outcomes (nonproxy contact). But they do find a significant positive stock
price effect for proposals offered by the State of Wisconsin Investment
Board (SWIB) around the outcome date (the annual meeting date or the
news date of a withdrawn proposal), and marginally significant (10%
level) negative returns on the announcement date for proposals relating to
antitakeover defenses and board composition or structure.43
39 See Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 380-83, 390-91. Karpoff et al. 's sample includes
proposals by both public pension funds and other investors; the stock price effects are insignificant
whether the proposals are separately grouped by type of proponent (such as by a pension fund or an
individual investor) or aggregated together. Although the returns were significantly negative for the
full sample on the day after the proxy mailing date, see id., at 381 tbl. 4, they do not explicitly report
this result and instead report the insignificance of the negative cumulative returns.
40 [d. at 382. As discussed in part II.B.2.c. infra, and as evident in the Karpoff et al. data,
executive compensation proposals are a small fraction of the proposals offered by institutional
investors, and this undoubtedly contributes to the difference between their result and the absence of
negative price effects in the aggregate data of the other studies, which do not separately examine this
proposal category.
41 Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 298-99. In contrast to the results in Karpoff et aI.,
supra note 21, Gillan & Starks further find a small positive stock price reaction (.2%) to the full set of
individually-sponsored proposals. Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 299.
42 See Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 322-26 tbl. 8.
43 See id. tbl. 8. Two other findings of significant positive returns in Del Guercio and
Hawkins' study are, in my judgment, problematic and are therefore not relied upon in this article's
analysis. They find significant positive returns on the outcome dates for the sample of proposals
sponsored by CalPERS but the significance of this subsample is driven by one firm with a confounding
event-at the same time as the outcome date for CaIPERS's proposal to rescind Avon Products' poison
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Finally, James FOljan, whose sample of proposals is not limited to
institutional investor activism, finds a significantly negative stock price
reaction on the proxy mailing date for firms subject to a shareholder
proposal in the 1978-91 proxy seasons; the abnormal return is not
significant when cumulated over one and two day intervals before and
after the mailing date.44 Whether the finding would persist were the sample
restricted to proposals by institutional sponsors as in the previously-
discussed studies of Wahal, Karpoff et al., and Del Guercio and Hawkins
is not known. Disaggregated by proposal type, the significant negative
returns occur solely for proposals to repeal staggered boards and to ban
greenmail or golden parachutes.45 Forjan further finds that for a subset of
27 firms where management reached an early agreement with the proposal
sponsor or where the proposal passed with a majority vote, the
announcement effect is significantly positive.46
A more narrowly-gauged study by Michael Smith, focused solely on
proposals sponsored by CalPERS, the largest activist public pension fund,
reports similar results to those of the broader-based studies.47 Smith finds
pill, newspapers reported that a noted corporate raider had acquired a 10% block of Avon stock and
intended to make a hostile takeover bid. See Karpoff et al., supra note 21, at 384. When the Avon
observation is eliminated from the CalPERS subsample, the returns are no longer significant. See Del
Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 325. They also find marginally positive significant returns (10%
level) for board-related proposals cumulated over one month before the announcement date through
one month after the outcome date. [d. The length of the period--several months--and the absence of
significant returns over the shorter intervals around either event date counsels against attributing the
statistical finding to the funds' activism.
44 See FOIjan, supra note 21, at 67.
45 [d.
46 [d. at 69. He does not, however, indicate the breakdown of the 27 cases into negotiated
and passing proposals, nor does he provide information concerning the subject matter of these
proposals, which prevents further analysis of his data for this article's purposes.
47 Smith, supra note 23. An additional study which focused on CaIPERS, by Stephen
Nesbitt, is not discussed in the text because it uses an idiosyncratic and unreliable calculation of the
performance measure. Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long-Term Rewards from Shareholder Activism: A Study of
the "CaIPERS Effect", S.c. CONTINENTAL BANK 1. ApPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1994, at 75
(reviewing CalPERS-sponsored proposals over 1987-92). Nesbitt finds that half of the firms CalPERS
targeted with proxy proposals experienced positive returns above the S&P 500 index over a five-year
period after the date ofCaIPERS's first letter to the firm. He does not, however, provide any statistical
tests of his data. Moreover, in contrast to the Del Guercio and Hawkins, Smith, and Wahal studies,
Nesbitt does not adjust for the firms' market risk in evaluating performance, which renders his results
less reliable (if the targeted firms were riskier than the market, higher than market returns would be
expected). Compounding the problem with interpreting his results, the number of firms in his sample
declines dramatically over time, which increases the likelihood that there is selection bias in the data.
Finally, he is examining stock prices over several years, which introduces considerable noise, making
it difficult to attribute with confidence any price effect to CaIPERS's targeting. In fact, Del Guercio
and Hawkins find that the higher returns of targeted firms over the S&P 500 index is not statistically
significant, and a control sample of non-targeted firms, comparable in performance, size and industry
to the targeted firms, has a similar increase in returns compared to the market. They thus conclude that
the improved performance Nesbitt attributes to CalPERS is due to some other factor, such as mean
reversion. Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 326. Consequently, in my judgment, Nesbitt's
results are not reliable, compared to all of the other studies that do not identifY long-term positive
performance effects from activism.
190
HeinOnline -- 18 Yale J. on Reg. 191 2001
Less is More
no significant stock price effect and no long-term effect on the firms'
operating performance from CalPERS' s activism, but a positive stock
price effect for the subset of CalPERS's proposals that succeeded.
However, what Smith classifies as successful proposals partially overlaps
with Wahal's nonproxy category, as they are described as instances where
the targeted firm either adopted the shareholder resolution or reached a
settlement with CalPERS which resulted in the proposal's withdrawal. In
addition, he finds a negative stock price effect upon the targeting event for
the subsample of proposals offered in 1987-88, the sample years when
CalPERS was selecting targets by the presence of antitakeover defenses
rather than financial performance, and during which none of its efforts
succeeded, in contrast to the later years' corporate governance proposals.
Similarly, a study of the proposals submitted by the United
Shareholders' Association (USA), a non-profit shareholder advocacy
organization which was founded by T. Boone Pickens, a prominent hostile
takeover bidder during the 1980s, and whose members were primarily
small shareholders, also found no significant stock price effect,48
Announcement of a successful negotiation agreement that resulted in a
potential proposal's withdrawal, however, produced a positive stock price
effect,49
2. Why Do Proposals Have Insignificant Performance Effects?
The consistent findings of statistical insignificance for shareholder
proposals are most plausibly a function of the value of the corporate
governance mechanisms that are the objects of the proposals. The
governance mechanisms of greatest interest to shareholder activists-
board reforms, takeover defenses, executive compensation, and
confidential voting-have been the subject of extensive research. In brief,
the types of board and compensation reforms advocated by proposal
sponsors have not been found to be value-enhancing corporate governance
devices; the results of the empirical research on antitakeover devices are
ambiguous, with only some findings of a negative impact from some of the
tactics that shareholder proposals seek to rescind; and the implementation
of confidential voting has no impact on voting outcomes or on firm
performance.
a. Boards ofDirectors
A focus of shareholder proposals that is typically commended by
48 Strickland et aI., supra note 21, at 335.
49 [d. at 334.
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commentators entails altering board composition and structure to enhance
the board's independence from management.50 Proposals of such board
reforms range from 9% to 16% of the total corporate governance proposals
in the shareholder activism studies.51 However, the firms with board
characteristics on which shareholder proposals focus, firms whose boards
have a majority of independent directors or that split the function of board
chairman and chief executive officer (CEO), do not perform significantly
better than those whose boards, respectively, have fewer outside directors52
50 E.g., Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, Essay: The Active Board of Directors and
Performance ofthe Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1283, 1291 (1998).
51 E.g., Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 298 (finding that board independence
issues comprise 9% of proposals); Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 286-87 tbl. 3 (stating that board
and committee independence proposals comprise 14% of proposals and 9% of institutions' proposals);.
Smith, supra note 23, at 234 (stating that board independence proposals comprise 9% of identifiable
proposals); Wahal, supra note 21, at 9 (stating that board independence issues comprise 16% of
proposals). Karpoff et al. do not report any board independence proposals in their identification of
proposals' content. Karpoff et aI., supra note 2I, at 372.
52 The extensive literature is reviewed in Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999) and
Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 284-
90 (1996). The overwhelming majority of studies find no significant correlation between performance
and independence, with a few finding a negative relation, including one of the most recent and
comprehensive studies, that by Bhagat and Black. Bhagat & Black, supra, at 944-49 (finding a
negative effect on performance where a super-majority of board is independent). Only one study, again
one of the more recent ones, finds a positive relation. Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 50. The text
adopts the findings of the vast majority of studies, that there is no relation between independence and
performance, and de-emphasizes the disparate results of these two more recent studies, because both
the Bhagat & Black and Millstein & MacAvoy studies use time series performance data but have only
one observation of independence, which makes it difficult to attribute with confidence the measured
performance (and change in performance) to the board's independence, as we do not know whether the
independence measure is constant over the period. Bhagat & Black, supra (noting that the
independence measure is from 1991 while performance is tracked from 1985-95); Millstein &
MacAvoy, supra note 50 (noting that the independence measure is from 1994 while performance is
averaged over 1991-95). An additional concern regarding the Millstein & MacAvoy study is that it
does not use the composition of the board to measure independence, nor does it use standard stock
price and accounting measures of performance. It uses instead, as its measure of board independence,
the grade assigned to a company by CalPERS, based on the firm's response to a survey requesting a
report on compliance with the guidelines for boards created by General Motors (GM); its performance
measure is a variant of a popular practitioner measure of firm value known as EVA, representing the
difference between earnings and the firm's return on capital. Although there are definite benefits from
trying to identify an alternative measure of board independence than directors' formal affiliations, as
the latter approach may obscure organizational nuances in which not all independent boards are
equally effective, use of the CalPERS survey is not particularly better in this regard, as categorization
by the presence of formal guidelines or procedures may also mask important operational differences.
In addition, the independence measure poses selection bias, as firms self-reported their compliance
levels. Firms that felt they would not provide CalPERS with the responses it was seeking in all
likelihood did not complete the survey, or the respondents provided information that they believed
would satisfY CalPERS, regardless of actual practices. The endogeneity of guideline adoption means
that a test will be unable to distinguish whether good performers adopt the GM guidelines or whether
the guidelines result in improved performance. In addition, the key component of EVA, return on
capital, is extremely difficult to measure, making this a less desirable performance measure to use than
stock and earnings measures, as it is not readily comparable across studies. One would have more
confidence in Millstein & MacAvoy's results, for example, if they had used multiple measures of
performance, as is done by other authors, including more conventional stock and accounting data, as
well as EVA, and found the same significant relation whatever the performance measure.
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or do not split these positions.53
Although independent boards do not affect performance, and hence
cannot be said to perform an ongoing monitoring function, they may
provide an episodic monitoring function by benefiting shareholders in
extraordinary or crisis situations.54 For example, Michael Weisbach found
that there is a higher probability of CEO turnover after significant poor
performance when outsiders control the board compared to insider-
controlled boards, although Wayne Mikkelson and Megan Partch find no
correlation between board composition, CEO turnover, and performance.55
Consistent with a crisis-management view, an event study of the
appointment of an outside director reports a significant positive price
effect even when a majority is already independent.56 Appointing an
independent director could signal that a company plans to address business
problems, even if board composition does not affect the firm's long-run
profitability.
The research on the effect of outside boards for takeover targets is
also ambiguous: one study found that board composition does not affect
the likelihood of a takeover or the size of the premium,57 while another
found that shareholder premiums were higher for targets with outsider-
dominated boards, particularly when the firm resisted the bid, but board
composition did not affect the success of a bid, and the mean total takeover
53 Of six studies of the split in office, four find no difference or, in fact, an improvement in
performance in the firms where the positions are not split. B. Ram Baliga et a!., CEO Duality and Firm
Performance: What's the Fuss?, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 41 (1996) (finding no significant
announcement stock price or long-tenn accounting operating performance effects); S.V. Berg & S.K.
Smith, CEO and Board Chairman: A Quantitative Study of Dual vs. Unitary Board Leadership, 3
DIREeroRS & BOARDS: THE 1. OF CORP. AerlON 34-37 (1978) (reporting mixed and inconclusive
results using several financial indices and concluding no significant difference); James A. Brickley et
a!., Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman ofthe Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189 (1997)
(noting that there is no difference or improved perfonnance for firms where the positions are not
separated, using stock price and accounting measures of perfonnance); Rajeswararao S. Chaganti et
a!., Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry, 22 J. MGMT.
STUD. 400 (1985) (finding no difference in failure rate in retail industry). Whereas two studies find
improved perfonnance in firms where the positions are split. Lynn Pi & Stephen G. Timme,
Corporate Control and Bank EffiCiency, 17 J. BANKING & FIN. 515 (1993) (noting that banks with
non-ehainnan chief executive officers and with higher stock ownership level of such chainnen have
higher retums on assets); Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, CEO Duality and Organizational
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155 (1991) (finding better accounting
performance measures in split position finns). This Article accepts the results of the majority of the
studies, that splitting the positions does not improve perfonnance, particularly because that is the
finding of the most comprehensive and sophisticated study, which is also the most recent, that by
Brickley et aI., supra.
54 Romano, supra note 52, at 290-91.
55 Compare Michael Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431
(1988) with Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary
Managerial Turnover, 44 J. FIN. ECON. 205 (1997).
56 Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and
Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1990).
57 Anil Shivdasani, Board Composition, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers, 16 J.
Acer. & ECON. 167 (1993).
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gain was not significantly different for outsider board finns (i.e., the
greater gains to target shareholders with independent boards came from
lower bidder returns).58 Finally, management-led buyouts of finns with
outsider boards have higher abnonnal returns than those with insider
boards,59 and takeover bidders with outsider boards experience less
negative abnonnal returns on the announcement of their bids than those
with insider boards,60 while the data on the impact of independent boards
on the value obtained from divestitures are ambiguous.61
Because the vast majority of finns will not be involved in hostile
takeovers or management buyouts, the expected benefit from increasing
board independence for the average finn is quite low, particularly as there
are no data indicating that the frequency of these acquisitive events is
higher for finns with independent boards. Moreover, the probability of
CEO turnover after poor perfonnance, although it may well be higher for
independent boards, is still extremely low and, of course, the board's
independent composition did not avert the poor perfonnance. It would
therefore be fair to conclude that the benefit to shareholders from an
independent board's perfonnance in certain extraordinary situations is
sufficiently limited to render more decisive, for assessing the significance
of board composition refonn, the overwhelming evidence that independent
boards do not produce perfonnance improvements. This point has even
more force because the finding of a positive impact on decision-making of
independent boards in extraordinary circumstances is itself in controversy
as it is not unifonnly identified in the literature.
One explanation for the failure to find perfonnance improvements
with independent boards is that the optimal board structure may well vary
across finns. Because the choice of board structure is endogenous to
management, if finns with different requirements select differing
proportions of outside directors, then we would not expect to find
significant perfonnance effects in a cross-sectional study of boards.
Shareholder proposals to change board structure, accordingly, will not
enhance finn value where management has already optimized on the
board's independence dimension; they will enhance value only if
58 James F. Cotter et al.. Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth
During Tender Offers?, 43 J. FIN. ECON. \95 (1997).
59 Chun Lee et aI., Board Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case ofManagement
Buyouts, 21 FIN. MGMT. 58 (\992).
60 John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence
From Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195 (\992).
6\ Robert C. Hanson & Moon H. Song, Managerial Ownership, Board Structure, and the
Division of Gains in Divestitures, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 55, 67-68 (2000) (noting that the size of selling
firms' abnormal stock returns is significantly positively related to a variable interacting the presence of
a positive total gain on the sale and the proportion of outside directors, albeit significantly negatively
related to the proportion of outside directors; however, when abnormal returns for only firms whose
sales produced a positive total gain are examined, board composition is not significant).
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management has made a mistake. The failure to document positive price
effects from shareholder proposals on board composition thus suggests
that pension funds do not possess superior information regarding optimal
board structure and, correlatively, that activism is not functioning to
improve a suboptimal board composition decision. Supporting this
inference is the fact that firms that are targeted for shareholder proposals
typically already have a majority of outside directors,62 and they may well
have a higher proportion of outsiders than non-targeted firms.63
A study by Anup Agrawal and Charles Knoeber, which attempts to
control statistically for the problem of the endogeneity of corporate
governance devices, provides further data that are at odds with the belief
of proponents of independent boards.64 They find a negative impact on
performance from board independence after controlling for other
governance devices and thus contend that firms are currently
suboptimizing board composition by nominating too many outside
directors.
In a subsequent paper, Agrawal and Knoeber examined board
composition more closely and identified a subset of "political" outside
directors whose career experience is conjectured to aid firms'
governmental interactions, that is, directors with political experience or
law degrees (such as former high-level government and military officials
serving on aerospace and defense firms' boards),6s They suggest that the
negative correlation between performance and board composition
identified in their earlier article may be spurious, in that firms subject to
political interference are poor performers and also have more outside
directors, particularly of the political variety.66 Consequently, board
composition choices may not be suboptimal, as they initially concluded.
Regardless of which of Agrawal and Knoeber's contentions is correct,
whether corporate boards have the optimal number of outside directors or
too many, their research implies that the market will not positively value
shareholder proposals seeking to move boards any further along the
independence dimension.
b. Takeover Defenses
The most popular type of proposal sponsored by institutional
62 John & Klein, supra note 21.
63 See Smith, supra note 23, at 240 (noting that targets have fewer insider directors than
control sample firms, but the difference is not statistically significant).
64 Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control
Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 377 (1996).
65 Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political
Role? forthcoming J. L. & ECON. (2001).
66 [d.
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investors (between 36% to 48% of institutional proposals) involves
elimination of takeover defenses, and the overwhelming majority of these
proposals concern rescission of poison pills.67 The empirical literature on
the price effects of the adoption of poison pills is, however, inconclusive.
Initial studies reported a significant negative price effect on the adoption
of a poison pill,68 but the results of subsequent research are mixed, with
one study still finding a negative effect and several studies reporting no
significant price effect for pills adopted after 1984.69 Moreover, one study
found a positive price effect for pill adoptions where the board of directors
consists of a majority of outsiders and a negative effect for firms with
insider boards.70
67 Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 298 (finding that 41 % of proposals involved
defensive tactics and of these 75% are poison pill proposals); Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 286-87
tbl. 3 (finding that 48% of institutional investor proposals involved defensive tactics and of these 61 %
are poison pill proposals); Smith, supra note 23, at 234 (finding that 45% of identifiable and 38% of
total proposals involved defensive tactics, and 77% of those are poison pill proposals); Wahal, supra
note 21, at 9 (finding that 36% of proposals involved defensive tactics and of these 81 % are poison pill
proposals). The proportion in the Karpoff et al. study is not accurately identifiable: the category,
"external corporate control market issues," which comprises 49% of identifiable institutional investor
proposals (breakdown by type not provided), excludes several defensive tactic proposals, such as
eliminating a staggered board, which are instead included in the category "internal corporate
governance issues," along with a variety of proposals that are not takeover-related, such as confidential
voting. Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 372.
68 Gregg Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Poison Pills: Stockholder
Protection - From the Good Guys or the Bad Guys?, 4 MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J. 39, 46 (1986)
(reporting that firms without confounding events and firms subject to takeover speculation had
negative returns); Paul H. Malatesta & Ralph A. Walkling, Poison Pill Securities: Stockholder Wealth.
Profitability and Ownership Structure, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 347 (1988) (reporting that the full sample had
negative returns as did firms without confounding effects); Michael Ryngaert, The Effect ofPoison Pill
Securities on Shareholder Wealth, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 377 (1988) (reporting that firms subject to
takeover speculation as well as firms without confounding events had negative returns); Gregg Jarrell
& Michael Ryngaert, Office of Chief Economist of the Securities and Exchange Commission, The
Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders (Oct. 23, 1986) (reporting that firms
subject to takeover speculation without confounding effects had negative returns). But even these
studies had either full or subsamples of firms with insignificant price effects.
69 Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 21 (1995)
(finding no significant effect); Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, Takeover Defenses and Wealth
Effects on Securityhoiders: The Case ofPoison Pill Adoptions, 20 1. BANKING & FIN. 1231, 1242-43
(1996) (showing insignificant findings for the full sample but significantly negative for a small subset
of nine firms that were subject to a takeover); Dana J. Johnson & Nancy L. Meade, Shareholder
Wealth Effects ofPoison Pills in the Presence ofAnti-Takeover Amendments, 121. ApPLIED BuS. REs.
10 (1996) (finding an insignificant effect); James M. Mahoney et aI., The Differential Impact on
Shareholder Wealth of Various Antitakeover Provisions, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 531
(1998) (finding a negative price effect for pills adopted during the period 1984-88). It should be noted
that there is an interpretation of the insignificant effects of pills in later-year event studies that is
consistent with their having a negative impact on shareholder wealth: the adoption of poison pills after
the tactic was upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 could have been anticipated by
shareholders and thus the negative impact was already impounded in the stock price at the pill
announcement date. In this interpretation, the appropriate event for determining the impact of poison
pills is the 1985 judicial decision.
70 James A. Brickley et aI., Outside Directors and the Adoption ofPoison Pills, 35 J. FIN.
ECON. 371, 379 (1994). The sample period was 1984-86, which includes the year 1984 during which
other studies have found negative price effects. /d. at 375; Comment & Schwert, supra note 69, at 21.
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The finding by one study of a positive impact of board composition
on market reactions to pills suggests that investors view independent
boards as having a higher probability of using a pill to run an auction and
raise the premium received rather than to deter a control transfer and that,
under such circumstances, they prefer to trade off a decreased probability
of a bid for an increased probability of an auction, should a bid occur.
Indeed, Brickley et al. found that bids for firms with pills and independent
boards resulted in significantly more auctions than firms with pills but
without independent boards.7) This is consistent with the finding that
independent boards generate higher target shareholder gains but not a
higher rate of successful bids - a higher frequency of auctions provides
an explanation for these data. This finding also suggests another difficulty
in interpreting the empirical literature that may explain· the disparate
empirical results: a pill adoption may provide new information to investors
concerning a firm's probability of a takeover, or management's level of
resistance to a bid, and hence price effects may be a function of the
market's assessment of that information (that is, a signalling effect) rather
than the value attributed to the pill itself.
Further complicating the interpretation of the impact of poison pill
adoptions, the efficacy of a pill's defensive effect, and hence the market
reaction, may be related to other defenses already in place. While this
contention is theoretically plausible, the few studies examining the price
effect of pill adoptions in conjunction with antitakeover charter
amendments have disparate results: they find either no difference or a
more positive return for firms with a prior antitakeover amendment.72 It
must be noted, however, that the results of studies of the adoption of
antitakeover charter amendments are also mixed, with the most frequent
result being a statistically insignificant price effect.73 This is not in itself
71 Brickley et aI., supra note 70, at 386-87.
72 Johnson & Meade, supra note 69, at 15-16 (finding that firms that did not have any
antitakeover charter amendments had insignificant negative abnormal returns while firms with fair
price or supermajority amendments had insignificant positive abnormal returns, and the difference in
mean abnormal return for the two groups is significant at 10%; when the antitakeover amendment
firms are subdivided by type, the returns to the firms with fair price provisions in place are
significantly positive and significantly different from the firms with no amendments but not from the
firms with supermajority amendments); Ryngaert, supra note 68 (finding no significant differences in
abnormal returns for firms with or without classified board amendments and fair price or supermajority
amendments). The Johnson & Meade data thus would appear to indicate that shareholder wealth
effects from pills are lower for firms with no prior defenses. Johnson & Meade, supra note 69, at IS.
73 E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Richard Jefferis, Voting Power in the Proxy Process: The Case of
Antitakeover Charter Amendments. 30 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 215-16 (1991) (upon correcting for
anticipation effects of the introduction of defensive charter amendments, estimating that the price
effect is negative); James A. Brickley et aI., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover
Amendments, 201. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988) (finding an insignificant effect); Harry DeAngelo & Edward
M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Shareholder Wealth, II J. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983)
(finding an insignificant effect); Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, Shark Repellents and Stock
Prices: The Effects ofAntitakeover Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 127 (1987) (finding an
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surprising since shareholders must approve the amendments, and we
would not expect them to vote for provisions that are contrary to their
interest. Indeed, Anup Agrawal and Gershon Mandelkar find a positive
relation between the wealth effect of an antitakeover charter amendment
proposal and the firm's institutional ownership (presumably the firm's
most informed voters).74 Moreover, in contrast to the poison pill studies,
there is a more negative stock price reaction to charter amendments when
the board is outsider-dominated.75 Thus, the benefits to shareholders from
independent board composition with regard to defensive tactics are, in fact,
ambiguous.
The studies of the interaction of poison pills and charter amendments
may not be the best test of the thesis that the efficacy of a poison pill
depends on firms' other defenses, however, because the most prevalent
amendment in the study samples, a fair price provision, has little impact on
a pill's defensive potency. A more informative test would be to examine
the most effective defense in conjunction with a pill, a staggered board,
rather than aggregated data on antitakeover charter amendments. Although
even here, the impact may be largely theoretical for it is unlikely that a
management which lost a proxy fight would continue to retain a pill and
resist the bid. The limited impact of a staggered board in practice is,
without doubt, a reason why pills were recrafted to include deadhand
provisions that sought to lock in which directors could redeem a pill, albeit
unsuccessfully, as these tactics were struck down by the COurtS.76
insignificant effect for fair price amendments); Scott C. Linn & John J. McConnell, An Empirical
Investigation of the Impact of 'Antilakeover' Amendments on Common Stock Prices, II J. FIN, ECON.
361 (1983) (finading a positive or insignificant effect). But as in the poison pill case, there are studies
that find significant negative price effects. E.g., Jarrell & Poulsen, supra (finding a negative effect for
the full sample and for supermajority amendment subsample); Mahoney et aI., supra note 69 (finding a
negative effect for the full sample and for some but not all subsamples); Victoria B. McWilliams &
Nilanjan Sen, Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments, 32 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 491,
497 (1997) (finding an insignificant effect for firms with independent boards and negative effect for
firms with insider boards).
74 Anup Agrawal & Gershon N. Mandelker, Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of
Managers: The Case ofAntitakeover Charter Amendments, 25 1. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 143, 159
(1990). Despite this finding, it is possible that shareholders vote for value-decreasing charter
amendments: Bhagat & Jefferis estimate that, regardless of the extent of firms' institutional ownership,
defensive charter amendments have an adverse effect on firm value when the insignificant returns
upon the proxy announcement are adjusted for the market's anticipation of the proposal. Bhagat and
Jefferis believe that a self-selection effect is working in which only certain firms, albeit
indistinguishable by institutional ownership, propose defensive amendments, but they do not offer an
explanation for why these firms' informed investors vote for amendments that decrease share value.
Bhagat & Jefferis, supra note 73. A possible explanation of the study's results that is consistent with
rational voting by institutions is that the anticipation-adjusted decline in price is not an indicia of a
negative value of the approved defenses but rather is an information effect, that is, an adverse updating
by the market regarding the firms' management quality or acquisition prospects, analogous to the
explanation of the price effects of nonproxy negotiations. Infra note I34 and accompanying text.
75 Chamu Sundaramurthy et aI., Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder
Wealth, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. 1. 231, 237 (1997).
76 E.g., Quicktum Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
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The ambiguous results concerning the wealth effects of poison pills
parallel the disagreement among commentators over the efficacy of
takeover auctions/7 as a pill's principal impact, providing management
with time to find a preferred bidder, is to foster an auction rather than to
end preclusively a bid.78 It is therefore not surprising that shareholder
proposals to rescind poison pills have not produced positive stock price
effects. Rescission would be expected to improve performance only if pill
adoption were more unequivocally a value-decreasing event.
The discussion of the corporate finance literature on takeover
defenses has focused on poison pills not only because they are the subject
of the most prevalent shareholder proposal on defensive tactics' repeal, but
also because some studies have found significant performance effects for
subsets of proposals containing poison pill rescissions. Before discussing
those results in relation to the finance literature, it must be noted that the
defenses besides poison pills that are the most common subject of
shareholder proposals, cumulative voting, staggered boards, and golden
parachutes, have not been as intensively empirically investigated as poison
pills. The wealth effects reported in the small number of studies examining
such defenses are not uniformly negative but are also positive or
insignificant, calling into question the efficacy of proposals to rescind
them, similar to the inference drawn from the research on poison pills. For
example, although the one study of board-sponsored amendments to
eliminate cumulative voting found a negative price effect,79 the one study
of the adoption of golden parachutes found positive price effects,80 and the
two charter amendment studies that separated out proposals to classify the
board found no significant effect.8l These findings suggest that only
proposals to restore cumulative voting might produce a beneficial wealth
effect for shareholders, but the only shareholder activism study that
separately reported the impact of this type of proposal, the study by Forjan,
found no significant effect.82 It should further be noted that Forjan also
1998).
77 Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1982) with Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1982).
78 Studies showing that firms with poison pills are not subject to fewer successful takeover
bids than firms without such defenses include Jamil Aboumeri, Poison Pills and Shareholder
Value/1992-96, 68 ASPEN LAW AND BUSINESS CORPORATION 24, at 1 (Dec. 15, 1997) and Comment
& Schwert, supra note 69.
79 Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority
Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 1. L. & ECON. 339 (1984). The one study of charter amendments that
separated out cumulative voting reductions from the other amendments also found a significant
negative effect, but the sample size is small (21 proposals). Mahoney et a1., supra note 69, at 537.
80 Richard Lambert & Donald Larckner, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-making
and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. 179 (1985).
81 Jarrell & Poulsen, supra note 73; Mahoney et a1., supra note 69.
82 Forjan, supra note 21, at 67 (noting 207 proposals).
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found a negative price effect for proposals to rescind golden parachutes
and staggered boards, defenses which have been found to have positive or
insignificant price effects, a combination of findings consistent with the
conclusion that such proposals are misguided from the perspective of
shareholder wealth-maximization.
Smith's finding of a significant negative price effect for the
CaIPERS's proposals in 1987-88 which focused on takeover defenses and
were largely poison pill proposals, Gillan and Starks' similar finding for
institutional investors' poison pill proposals, and Del Guercio and
Hawkins' finding of a marginally significant negative price effect for
antitakeover and board proposals (the bulk of the proposals in the group
are antitakeover proposals, and poison pill rescissions predominate among
these proposals),83 are consistent with the studies finding that poison pills
do not decrease shareholder wealth and may, on occasion, increase it,84
This interpretation of the literature is supported by a study of poison pill
shareholder proposals that found targeted firms more frequently revise
their poison pills than nontargeted firms. 85 If such revisions, undertaken by
management's being responsive to shareholder actions, weaken a pill's
effectiveness, a negative market response anticipating such an effect
83 Antitakeover provisions comprised 110 of 140 proposals in Del Guercio and Hawkins'
grouping, with the most frequent (83) being rescission ofa poison pill. Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra
note 3, at 298 (calculated from tbl. I). Pills are the subject of virtually all of the proposals submitted in
1987-88 in Smith's sample (IS of 17). Smith, supra note 23, at 234 tbl. I. Del Guercio and Hawkins
also found that virtually all of the SWIB proposals that had a positive price effect at the time of the
outcome date (the annual meeting date or the news date of a withdrawn proposal) were proposals to
rescind poison pills. Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 298. One explanation for this contrary
result might be market anticipation of a subsequent acquisition given knowledge of the level of
shareholder support for pill rescission, as the date is after the vote. But Del Guercio and Hawkins
report that SWIB's targets were not significantly more likely to be subject to a takeover attempt than
other sample firms, although targets· receiving antitakeover proposals were. Id. at 318-19. An
alternative explanation is that the result is spurious (that is, due to some other factor) because the event
date is the shareholder meeting date, in contrast to the event date in the studies that identified negative
effects, the proxy mailing date: random samples using annual meeting dates produce significant
positive returns, in contrast to those using proxy mailing dates. James A. Brickley, Interpreting
Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings, 21 J.
FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 343, 346-47 (1986). Finally, SWIB, as an active stock-picking fund, is well-
informed concerning its specified targets and focuses on antitakeover issues, in contrast to other
activist institutions that are more heavily indexed and hence less informed about the particulars of their
portfolio firms. Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 301,305-06. SWIB might therefore be better
able to identify firms where pill rescissions do maximize share value than other proponents of such
measures, whose proposals, along with SWIB's, are included in the studies finding negative price
effects. Accordingly, firm-specific information (such as board composition), which appears in the
finance literature to effect significantly the impact of poison pills on firms, may also affect the efficacy
of shareholder proposals to repeal such defenses, and explain the contrary finding regarding SWIB's
proposals.
84 An alternative interpretation of the negative stock price effect of poison pill proposals as
a signal of management quality rather than an assessment of the value of a pill, will be discussed in the
next section, because it is dependent on the finding of positive price effects from private negotiations
with management concerning poison pill rescissions. Part I1-B-3, infra.
85 Bizjak & Marquette, supra note 21.
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explains the shareholder proposal data.
c. Executive Compensation
Proposals concerning executive compensation, which typically seek
reductions in the level of pay, are a much smaller proportion of corporate
governance proposals than the antitakeover proposals. In the Karpoff et al.
study, they were approximately 10% of identified proposals (42 of 408),
and none were sponsored by pension funds. 86 Although there are also no
compensation proposals in Del Guercio and Hawkins' study of pension
fund activism,8? public pension funds do sponsor this type of proposal,
while at a far lower rate than proposals on defensive tactics (less than 10%
of their proposals).88
This category of proposals was the subset producing negative price
effects in the Karpoff et al. study. The substance of the proposals may
explain this fact: proposals calling for limits on executive compensation
are at odds with the empirical literature that finds that compensation and
performance are positively correlated.89 A majority of the compensation-
related shareholder proposals in the Karpoff et al. study called for limits on
executive payor requirements that directors own stock,90 While directors'
compensation in stock might function as an incentive-aligning device that
improves performance, in fact, studies investigating the relation between
performance and directors' stock ownership have not consistently
documented a significant positive relation.91 It should also be noted that all
86 See Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 372.
87 Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 297-98 (noting that no compensation proposals,
including proposals to cap executive pay, are sponsored by the pension funds in the sample).
88 Wahal, supra note 21, at 9 (observing that compensation proposals are 4% of proposals);
Smith, supra note 23, at 234 (noting that compensation proposals are 8% of identifiable proposals and
6% oftolal proposals). Smith does not report separate performance results for this proposal category.
Wahal does not examine performance effects by proposal category. In Gillan and Starks' sample,
executive compensation proposals comprise .02% of the proposals sponsored by institutions. Gillan &
Starks, supra note 28, at 287 tbI. 3.
89 E.g., Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure. Ownership. and Firm
Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163 (1995) (noting the positive relation between performance and
portion of total compensation paid in stock); Kevin Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial
Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. ACCT. & ECON. II (1985) (noting the positive relation
between performance and total compensation).
90 Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 371.
91 E.g., Sanjai Bhagat et aI., Director Ownership. Corporate Performance and Management
Turnover, 54 Bus. LAW. 885, 907 (\ 999) (noting the positive relation between past performance and
directors' stock ownership); Mehran, supra note 89, at 180 (no relation); Randall Morek et aI.,
Management Ownership and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Analysis, 20 1. FIN. ECON. 293
(1988) (nonlinear relation). It should be noted that Bhagat et a\. do not test precisely whether
ownership improves performance, because they are correlating stock ownership with past, not future
performance (that is, they find performance in 1991-92 is positively correlated with ownership in
1993). They did find that a dummy variable indicating whether directors were given stock options in
1992 and 1993 was significantly related to stock returns in 1994, but there was no relation between
grants and stock returns in any of the other sample years. Bhagat et aI., supra, at 899 tbI. 4, panel B7.
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five of the CalPERS-sponsored executive compensation proposals in
Smith's study were proposals to reduce top management's compensation,
and it is important to add that, despite the small number, these proposals
were 15% of the proposals Smith identified as successful, the same success
rate achieved by the takeover defense proposals in his sample.92
Two studies have focused solely on the impact upon actual pay levels
of executive compensation proposals. The initial study of the effect on
firm compensation policy of shareholder proposals involving executive
compensation, by Marilyn Johnson, Susan Porter, and Margaret Shackell,
found that both compensation levels and sensitivity of pay to performance
decreased for firms targeted by CaIPERS, but there was no significant
effect on compensation from the submission of a shareholder proposal in
general.93 Although their study does not indicate whether CaIPERS's
activism was directed at compensation issues for all of the targeted sample
firms, it does provide anecdotal instances of management agreeing to
reduce executive pay after meetings with CaIPERS.94 Their anecdotes are
consistent with Smith's reported high success rate ofCaIPERS's executive
compensation proposals (80%).95 Given the literature detailing the positive
impact of total compensation, as well as incentive (equity) compensation,
on performance, to the extent CaIPERS's activism results in lower
compensation that is less sensitive to performance, it is not beneficial to
targeted firms' shareholders.
The second study, by Randall Thomas and Kenneth Martin, found
that the compensation of targeted firms' CEOs did not increase as rapidly
as that of non-targeted firms' CEOs after targeting, but the decrease was
not statistically significant.96 This corroborates the results of Johnson et
al. 's study concerning the absence of an impact of compensation
proposals. Prior to targeting, Thomas and Martin find that the targeted
firms' managers had higher compensation than the average compensation
Bhagat et al. also find that CEO turnover appears to be more frequent with higher stock ownership by
directors, given poor performance, id. at 909, a result consistent with Weisbach's finding of higher
CEO tumover in poor performers with independent boards, see Weisbach, supra note 55, but this result
on director equity ownership and CEO tumover is not robust across all of the regression models, see
Bhagat et aI., supra, at 910.
92 Smith, supra note 23, at 234.
93 Marilyn F. Johnson et aI., Stakeholder Pressure and the Structure of Executive
Compensation 20 (May 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation)
(examining a sample of 186 firms, 26 with proposals and 4 targeted by CalPERS; noting that
compensation levels and sensitivity to performance were unaffected by shareholder proposal but
negatively affected by identification as a target ofCalPERS).
94 Id.
95 Smith, supra note 23, at 234 (noting that 4 of 5 proposals to reduce executive
compensation were successful).
96 Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth 1. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on
Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 1021, 1065-66 (1999) (examining 168 proposals
submitted to 145 firms in 1993-97).
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of managers in similarly-sized firms in their industry, and received more of
their compensation in the form of incentive pay (stock options) than non-
targeted firm managers, but only the cash salary component is statistically
different,97 The higher than industry-average compensation level persisted
after the proposal, despite the lower rate of increase in pay.98 After
targeting, the targeted firms' CEOs' compensation packages shifted more
toward cash than to long-term incentive compensation (that is, stock
options, not cash salaries were reduced).99 Although this difference was
also not statistically significant, it is a result, similar to that of the Johnson
et al. study, that suggests that executive compensation proposals do not
benefit shareholders because they reduce, rather than promote, the use of
the compensation form that better aligns shareholder and manager interests
than fixed-cash payments, incentive stock options. IOO In fact, adoptions of
incentive compensation plans have positive price effects. lol
The conclusion that shareholder activism involving compensation
issues is non-value-maximizing is further supported by the finding of
Andrew Prevost and John Wagster that firms on CalPERS's 1990 and
1991 "hit list"-the firms CalPERS was publicly targeting under its
shareholder activism program in those years--experienced a negative
stock price effect to two events in 1992: Congressional hearings on a bill
to permit shareholder resolutions on executive compensation and increase
proxy disclosure on compensation, and an SEC proposal thereafter to
increase the shareholder votes required on executive compensation issues
and to adopt a new method of valuing stock options in proxy statements. 102
Prevost and Wagster interpret these data as indicating that facilitating
corporate governance directed at executive compensation by increased
disclosure rules does not benefit shareholders because the disclosure,
equally available to stakeholders with interests other than value-
maximization, such as unions, political activists and the press, as it is to
97 Id. at 1063.
98 Id. at 1065. Thomas and Martin use a different year than Johnson et al. for post-proposal
compensation, which, besides the difference in sample composition, may explain the slight difference
in results. When they examine compensation two years after the proposal, they find the decrease in
incentive pay is significant, as well as the increase in salary.Id. at 1067.
99 Id. at 1065-66. In fact, one of the results that Thomas and Martin state they cannot
explain, the finding that the CEO's industry-adjusted compensation level post-proposal is higher for
individual rather than union sponsors, id. at 1069, can be explained when considered in conjunction
with Johnson et al. 's findings: namely, institutional investors exercise more influence on compensation
committees than individuals.
100 For the classic statement of the optimal incentive compensation package for an agent see
Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1979).
101 See James A. Brickley et aI., The Impact ofLong-Range Managerial Compensation Plans
on Shareholder Wealth, 7 1. ACCT. & ECON. 115, 125-26 (1985).
102 Andrew K. Prevost & John D. Wagster, Impact of the 1992 Changes in the SEC Proxy
Rules and Executive Compensation Reporting Requirements 18·20 (Sept. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). A control firm of non-targeted firms matched
by size and industry did not experience negative returns on the event dates. /d. at 21.
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investors, will encourage stakeholder pressure on boards to weaken the
"pay-for-performance" sensitivity of management compensation.103 Their
explanation of the data is corroborated by the studies of executive
compensation proposals: a negative stock price reaction to the SEC
disclosure rule indicates an expectation that firms will be pressured to
diminish incentive compensation plans. This expectation is borne out, as
the performance sensitivity of the pay of executives at CalPERS-targeted
firms decreased significantly, and at union-targeted firms decreased, albeit
insignificantly, after being targeted subsequent to the SEC rule change.
Given the content of many compensation proposals-to limit pay and
restrict incentive compensation practices-it is not a surprise that
shareholder activism, when compensation is the object, has not been found
to improve performance. The perverse effects that would accompany the
adoption of such proposals-<lecreased incentives for managers to increase
share value-in all likelihood explains the negative stock price reaction to
CaIPERS's activism in connection with such proposals, as there is a higher
probability that boards will respond to CaIPERS's compensation demands
(and indeed they have done so), than to the individual shareholders who
more typically sponsor compensation proposals. It must also be noted that
other shareholders appear to be aware of the problematic value of the
proposals. Compensation proposals receive far less voting support than
other corporate governance proposals, typically not much more than 10%
compared to over 30% for proposals involving defensive tactics. 104
One recent form of executive compensation proposal involves
preventing the resetting of executive stock option contracts (or subjecting
resetting to shareholder approval). If options are not repriced after stock
price declines, the executive receiving them will be unable to profit from
that form of incentive compensation (the option exercise price will be
above the stock price at expiration). Shareholders opposed to repricing
contend that it simply rewards poor performance, in contrast to repricing
firms' contentions that it is necessary to retain valuable employees whose
compensation has otherwise declined. 105 This category of proposal has,
103 Id. at 6.
104 For example, Thomas and Martin report an average support of 11.3% for compensation
proposals, see Thomas & Martin, supra note 96, at 1061-62, and Del Guercio and Hawkins report an
average support of 34% for corporate governance proposals which did not include any compensation
proposals, see Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 296. This difference in relative voting support
is consistent across samples. E.g., Gordon & Pound, supra note 28, at 704-05 tbl. 11 (showing that
compensation-related proposals dominate the list of proposals receiving the lowest percentage of
votes--Iess than 7%--and none are in the list of proposals with the highest proportion of votes--over
40%--which are dominated by poison pill and confidential voting proposals); Romano, supra note 11
at 35 (finding that in firms with confidential voting, executive compensation proposals averaged 11.6%
of the votes, defensive tactic proposals averaged 33%, and the average for all shareholder proposals is
26.6%); SANDER, supra note 3, at 78 (showing that compensation-related proposals' average voting
support is lower than that ofother proposals).
105 E.g., Adam Bryant, Stock Options that Raise Investors' Ire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998,
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unfortunately, not been empirically studied, as it is a relatively new object
of activism. Because of recent accounting changes for the treatment of
repriced options, the number of firms reporting option repricing has
declined over the past year.106 Consequently, shareholder proposals to
prohibit repricing may not prove to be prevalent enough to become a
subject worthy of empirical research.
Although there has been no empirical research on shareholder
proposals to prevent repricing, there has been some investigation on the
efficacy of option resetting, and this research does not support a
conclusion that it should be banned as activist investors have proposed:
studies have found that the impact on shareholders of option repricing is
insignificant, although the impact on the executives whose options are
repriced is great,107 In addition, a study examining the characteristics of
firms that reprice options found that it does not entrench management
because the top management turnover of firms repricing options is
significantly higher the year after the repricing than the CEO turnover for
non-repricers. I08 Because we do not lrnow whether these are voluntary or
involuntary departures, this finding may also undercut the contention in
favor of repricing that it is necessary to retain top managers. However,
among repricing firms, the CEO turnover rate was significantly higher
when the CEO's option was not repriced (40% of the repricing firms)
compared to when it was, and thus the authors conclude that the relation
between repricing and turnover shows up in higher turnover in the absence
of repricing rather than lower turnover in its presence, which supports the
rationale offered for repricing by its proponents. I09
d. Confidential Voting
Proposals to adopt confidential voting are equal to proposals to
at DI.
106 IRRC, Number of Companies Repricing Options Has Plummeted, IRRC Finds, II IRRC
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS 105 (July 7, 2000).
107 E.g., Menachem Brenner et aI., Altering the Terms ofExecutive Stock Options, 57 J. FIN.
ECON. 103 (2000); Don M. Chance et aI., The 'Repricing' ofExecutive Stock Options, 57 J.FIN. ECON.
129 (2000); N. K. Chidambaran & Nagpumanand R. Prabhala, "Executive Stock Option Repricing,
Internal Governance Mechanisms, and Management Turnover" (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). Besides these empirical studies of the effects of option
repricing, the optimality of repricing behavior has been formally modelled. Viral Acharya et al. find
that in most cases (except where managerial influence on compensation practices is extremely high),
resetting benefits shareholders (it increases firm value) compared to a compensation policy that
precommits to never resetting. Viral Acharya et aI., On the Optimality of Resetting Executive Stock
Options, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 65 (2000). This model suggests that empirical studies involving the most
recent type of compensation proposal, option repricing prohibitions, will not alter the inference drawn
from the prior literature; that the objects of shareholder initiatives regarding executive compensation
do not enhance firm value and may indeed lower it.
108 Chidambaran & Prabhala, supra note 107, at 10.
109 Id. at 24-25.
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eliminate defensive tactics in frequency of institutional sponsorship,
ranging from 18% to 44% of the proposals in studies of institutional
investor activism. 110 In contrast to the other categories of shareholder
proposals, which are substantively directed, proposals for confidential
voting seek to alter shareholder voting patterns and thereby recalibrate the
internal dynamics of the firm with the expectation that this will improve
performance. The rationale for this expectation is that conflicts of interest
prevent certain shareholders from voting against management where to do
so would maximize share value. II I
In particular, proponents of confidential voting contend that money
managers aspire to do business with the firm whose shares they hold, such
as to manage the firm's pension fund, and that such business prospects
would be jeopardized by voting against management. I 12 They
correspondingly expect that these money managers will not feel
constrained to vote with management when it is against their interest as
shareholders, were management to be unable to ascertain how they voted
(that is, they believe that confidential voting will eliminate institutional
investors' conflicts of interest in proxy voting). I13
It is intuitively plausible to expect voting institutions to affect
outcomes: in the U.S. election context, for instance, the adoption of
110 See Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 298 (showing that confidential voting
proposals comprise 44% of proposals; over 70% of these proposals were sponsored by one fund,
NYCERS); Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 286-87 tbl. 3 (showing that confidential voting proposals
comprise 12% of proposals and 31 % of institutions' proposals); Smith, supra note 23, at 234 (showing
that confidential voting proposals comprise 18% of identifiable proposals and 15% of all proposals);
Wahal, supra note 21, at 9 (showing that confidential voting proposals comprise 41 % of proposals).
Confidential voting proposals in the Karpoff et al. study are included in the "internal corporate
governance issues" category (51% of identifiable institutional investors' proposals), which contains a
variety of other proposals, including some more properly classified' as defensive tactics, such as
eliminating a staggered board. See Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 372.
III E.g., John Pound, Proxy Contests and the Efficiency ofShareholder Oversight, 20 1. FIN.
ECON. 237 (1988).
112 See. e.g., id.; Black, supra note 6; LTV Corp., Proxy 24 (Mar. 3, 1995) (proposal
proponent's supporting statement).
113 E.g., Pound, supra note III ; LTV Corp., supra note 112. There is no systematic evidence
that this hypothesis is correct, however. One study provides indirect evidence on the issue that appears
consistent with the hypothesis: Brickley et al. report that support for management proposals is higher
when the voting pool contains more institutional investors that may have business relations with the
firms (i.e., banks and insurance companies). James A. Brickley et aI., Ownership Structure and Voting
on Anti-takeover Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267 (1988). However, this study does not observe
institutional investors' actual votes, so we do not know if the institutions that the authors deem
''pressure sensitive" (banks and insurance companies) were supporting management at higher rates
than other shareholders (nor does the study control for the presence or absence of confidential voting,
which is the actual hypothesis of interest for evaluating the efficacy of shareholder proposals to
implement confidential voting). In fact, there has been one case study in which the author was able to
correlate votes with shareholders, and it found, in contrast to the Brickley et al. study, that the financial
institutions that had specific business relations with the targeted corporation did not vote in favor of
management at a higher rate than institutions that did not have such "pressure-sensitive" relations.
Karen Van Nuys, Corporate Governance through the Proxy Process: Evidence from the 1989
Honeywell Proxy Solicitation, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 101 (1993).
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"Australian" ballots-state-prepared and administered ballots that are
secret, in contrast to the party ballot system-was associated with an
increase in ticket-splitting, although the change in ballot form (organized
by office rather than party) appears to have had a more significant effect
than the confidentiality of the ballot. 1l4 However, it is also quite possible
that the main effect of the Australian ballot was not to alter voting
outcomes but rather, to reduce party expenditures on election campaigns,
as it eliminated the bribes parties were paying voters under the open ballot
system because they no longer could be assured of the bribes' desired
outcome. I IS Under this alternative hypothesis, the procedural reform was
adopted because it was in the interest of the major political parties, and not
simply due to effective reformist agitation. The analogy in the proxy
context is that confidential voting is adopted by managers because they do
not expect it to produce voting outcomes that are adverse to their interest.
I conducted the one study of the effect of confidential shareholder
voting and concluded that it doesn't matter. 116 Paralleling the findings
concerning shareholder proposals substantively directed at improving
corporate governance by reforming board composition, repealing takeover
defenses and altering executive compensation, confidential voting has no
significant impact on voting outcomes. In particular, after controlling for
the widely-reported trend of increasing voting support for shareholder
proposals in the 1990s,117 there is no significant difference in voting
114 Jerrold G. Rusk, The Effect ofthe Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-
1908,64 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1220 (1970).
115 Alan Gerber provides a model for when political parties would prefer secret to open
bal10ts in order to reduce bribery. Alan Gerber, The Adoption of the Secret Bal10t (June 1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). The conditions under which
U.S. states switched to the Australian bal10t in the late 19th century--increasingly competitive
elections-·are consistent with his model's predictions. In support of this hypothesis, in a history of the
reform, L.E. Fredman states that over time, several observers pointed out that the Australian bal10t
checked obvious bribery abuses but did not seriously weaken the power of political machines. L.E.
FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN REFORM 85 (1968). In addition,
Jac Heckelman examines voting turnout in the presence of secret bal10ts and finds that there is a
positive income effect, which suggests that the poor were more likely to vote prior to the enactment of
secret bal10ts (that is, when they could sel1 their votes). Jac C. Heckelman, Revisiting the Relationship
Between Secret Ballots and Turnout, 28 AM. POL. Q. 194, 205 (2000). Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow
note that some commentators contend that the Australian bal10t was adopted to weaken mass political
activism, particularly by the labor movement. Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth:
Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Marketfor Polilicallnfluence, 50 STAN. L. REv. 837,840
n.9 (1998). Whatever the accuracy of that hypothesis in the political arena, it does not appear to have
much weight in the shareholder proxy voting context, because union funds support confidential voting
proposals.
116 Romano, supra note I I. My study examines the difference in mean voting outcomes on
shareholder, as wel1 as management, proposals before and after a firms' adoption of confidential
voting, for I 18 firms adopting confidential voting between 1987-97.
I 17 See, e.g., GEORGESON & COMPANY, INC., 1998 ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (1998) (graph of votes for poison pill proposals from 1987 through 1999,
shows steady increase in support from 20% to 45%); IRRC, Average voting results on major corporate
governance shareholder proposals, IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 20 (July-Sept. 1995)
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support for shareholder proposals after the adoption of confidential voting.
Because the average support level varies with the type of proposal,
separate comparisons were also performed controlling for proposal types.
In the most robust test of the hypothesis, the subset of shareholder
proposals to repeal or modify defensive tactics, support goes up over time
at a rate similar to that reported in the general literature (1.8% a year), but
there is no independent increase in voting support after the adoption of
confidential voting. The support for management proposals increased more
dramatically than that for shareholder proposals after the adoption of
confidential voting, but again, when controlling for a time trend, the effect
of the voting procedure disappeared.
The change in voting procedure also had no impact on performance:
there was no stock price effect upon the announcement of the procedural
change, nor did long run stock performance improve over one to three
years after its implementation. I18 Of course, if, as this Article contends, the
object of the overwhelming majority of shareholder proposals does not
improve performance, than changing the voting procedure to enhance the
probability of such proposals' adoption will not improve performance
either.
The insignificant impact of confidential voting on voting outcomes
plausibly explains why many firms voluntarily adopt the procedure: it
doesn't matter. 119 The conclusion to draw from the data on confidential
voting is consistent with the overall conclusion drawn from the more
extensive empirical literature studying the three other principal categories
of shareholder proposals: the benefit of promoting such proposals is, at
best, marginal, because the procedure has no discernible behavioral effect.
(indicating an increase (decrease) in average votes from 1994 to 1995 of over 3% for 8 (2) shareholder
proposal categories, and an increase (decrease) of less than 1% in 1 (3) categories, and none of the
categories with decreases involved defensive tactics); IRRC, Voting on U.S. Governance Shareholder
Resolutions, xv IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 3 (Apr.-June 1998) (indicating
increasing support levels for poison pill and staggered board proposals, as well as board independence
proposals in 1998 compared to 1997 proxy votes but decreases in executive compensation and
cumulative voting proposal support levels); Gillan & Starks, supra note 28, at 295-96 (describing
increase in mean support of shareholder proposals after 1990) SANDER, supra note 3, at 4-5 (indicating
that the average support for almost all types of shareholder proposals increased over five years 1986-
90, and noting that three categories experienced over 1°point increases, two of which involved
defensive tactics).
I I 8 Romano, supra note 1I, at 23-24.
I 19 To check whether there is a sample selection bias-that is, whether only firms whose
shares are not held by the private institutional investors which are posited to have conflicting interests
under non-anonyinous voting, see text and accompanying notes 111-12, supra. I examined the
portfolios of the largest private equity mutual fund managers and managers of pension accounts (as
identified in Pensions and Investments as the largest fund managers) and found no evidence of such a
bias: these funds held significantly more positions in the firms that have adopted confidential voting
than in a random sample of firms that have not adopted confidential voting. See Romano, supra note
II, at 24-25.
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3. Private Negotiation and Information Updating Regarding
Managerial Quality
In contrast to submitted proposals, institutional investors' private
negotiation governance strategies on occasion produce significant positive
stock price effects. These results are consistent with, as previously
discussed, Wahal's finding distinguishing between submitted proxy
proposals and successful private negotiations that obviated the need for a
proposal, Smith's finding of a positive effect for successful targeting
(assuming this subsample is dominated by instances of nonproxy rather
than proxy activism), and Forjan's finding of a positive announcement
effect for successful negotiations (assuming that the cases of negotiations
dominate those of the proposals that passed in his 27-firm sample
combining the two cases). Two more recent studies, however, find that
negotiation activity in the mid-1990s is associated with a negative effect
on performance. The studies of negotiated agreements are summarized in
Table 2.
Willard Carleton, James Nelson and Michael Weisbach examined the
impact of the corporate governance activities ofTIAA-CREF, which seeks
to negotiate privately with firms it has targeted and typically reaches an
agreement with management that results in its not having to submit a
proposa1.1 20 Carleton et al. found no significant changes in accounting
measures of long-term performance from TIAA-CREF's activism, but the
stock price effect of the initial targeting was significant, depending on the
substantive content of the negotiations. It was significantly positive for
targeting with the goal of restricting poison pills, significantly negative for
targeting seeking to increase the diversity of the composition of the board
of directors, and insignificant for targeting to institute confidential
voting. 121
120 Carleton et a!., supra note 23, at 1356.
121 [d. at 1351. The stock price effects around the time in which the firms publicly
announced their action to comply with TIAA-CREF's demands were generally not statistically
significant, but these were not robust tests because very few firms publicly announced these actions
(number ofobservations ranged from 1-11 firms, depending on the subsample). [d.
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TABLE 2. PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER NEGOTIATIONS
(NONPROXY TARGETING) ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Study No. Non No. Sponsors Years Performance
proxy Firms Effect
targeting
Carleton et al. 62 45 TIAA-CREF 1992- mixed
( 1998) 96
Chidambaran & 224 168 Individuals & 1985- insignificant a
Woidtke (1999) institutions 95
Crutchley et al. n.a. 47 CalPERS's 1992- insignificant b
(2000) target list 97
Del Guercio & 16 n.a. 5 activist 1987- insignificant
Hawkins (1999) funds 93
Forjan (1999) 27 27 Individuals & 1978- positive
institutions 91
Gp1er & n.a. 96 Council of 1991- positive
Sokobin (1995) Institutional 93
Investors' list
Smith (1996) n.a. 19 CalPERS 1987- positive
93
Strickland et al. 53 34 USA 1992- positive
(1996) 93
Wahal (1996) 50 n.a. 9 activist 1987- positive
funds 93
Note: n.a.- information not available
'negative for public and union funds after 1992
b pre-I 994 targets positive; post-I 994 targets negative
Another positive finding concerning "behind the scenes" activism
involves a study by Deon Strickland, Kenneth Wiles and Marc Zenner of
the firms targeted by USA I24 When management agreed to USA's
requested changes prior to the proxy proposal submission deadline, the
targeted firms experienced positive stock price effects in contrast to the
insignificant effect when USA presented a proxy proposal. The negotiated
agreements involved takeover defenses (subdivided into poison pill and
golden parachute removal proposals), board composition and confidential
voting; contrary to the TIAA-CREF study, there was no difference in the
sign and significance of the price effects across USA's three types of
122 Carleton et aI., supra note 23, at 1356.
123 /d. at 1351. The stock price effects around the time in which the firms publicly
announced their action to comply with TIAA-CREF's demands were generally not statistically
significant, but these were not robust tests because very few firms publicly announced these actions
(number of observations ranged from I-II firms, depending on the subsample).ld.
124 Strickland et aI., supra note 21.
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proposals.125 To identify the source of the wealth gain for the subset of
agreements to remove takeover defenses, Strickland et aI. calculated the
firms' abnormal returns on the announcement of the defenses' adoptions:
they were insignificantly negative for poison pills and insignificantly
positive for golden parachutes. 126 There was also no relation between the
abnormal returns upon the announcement of the defenses and the abnormal
returns upon the announcement of their negotiated removal, which makes
it difficult to identify the source of the wealth gain from the negotiations.
Tim Opler and Jonathan Sokobin examined the returns of firms on the
Council ofInstitutional Investors' (CII) "focus-list" of poor performers. 127
The CII is an organization of public and private pension funds that serves
as a clearinghouse for the funds' corporate governance activities. Opler
and Sokobin find that the targeted firms experience better market and
operating performance than the market as a whole and other benchmark
portfolios in the year subsequent to their inclusion on the CII list. They
infer from this result that coordinated investor action that takes place
behind the scenes ("quiet activism") is effective in improving firm
performance, in contrast to the proxy proposal route, which often involves
campaigns by one investor, and for which studies do not find positive
effects.128 This is only an inference because we do not know whether the
firms on the focus-list were indeed the targets of institutional investor
activism. But it is consistent with the findings of Carleton et aI., Smith,
Strickland et al. and Wahal concerning privately negotiated (nonproposal)
activism by institutional investors.
Claire Crutchley, Carl Hudson, and Marlin Jensen investigate
targeting activities of CalPERS by examining the stock price reaction to a
firm's initial placement on the fund's publicly announced list of targets.129
They find a short-run positive price effect but conclude that for the full
sample there is no lasting impact on performance.13o They then divide their
sample in two, the early years, 1992-94, when CalPERS's activist
corporate governance campaign was quite visible, and the later years,
1995-97, when it played a "quieter," that is, a less visible, behind-the-
scene role. Crutchley et al. find that over the year after targeting, the early
years' subsample has a significantly positive cumulative return, whereas
the later years subsample's cumulative return is negative. 13 I After finding
that restructuring actions taken by the targeted firms after targeting do not
125 [d. a1334.
126 [d. at 335.
127 QPLER & SOKOBIN, supra note 2I.
128 [d. at 6-8, 19.
129 Claire E. Crutchley et aI., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS , Activism, 7 FIN.
SERVICES REv. (forthcoming).
130 [d. at ms. 9, tbl. 4.
131 [d. at ms. 10.
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affect the size of the abnormal return, their conclusion, in contrast to that
of Opler and Sokobin, is that visible or aggressive public activism, and not
quiet activism, increases shareholder wealth. 132
Finally, N.K. Chidambaran and Tracie Woidtke studied the
shareholder proposals that were withdrawn from 1989-1995.133 They find
that the characteristics of firms where proposals are withdrawn have
changed over time, particularly after the adoption in 1992 by the SEC of
changes in the proxy process intended to facilitate shareholder
communication. In contrast to the other four studies evaluating
negotiations over proposals, their measure of firm value is the change over
the proposal year in Tobin's Q, the ratio of the firm's market value to book
value. A Tobin's Q that is greater than 1 indicates that the market values
the firm's assets above their book value (that is, the firm has significant
intangible asset value). This is commonly interpreted as an indicium of
good performance. Although for the full sample of withdrawn proposals
there is no significant performance effect, for the set of proposals
withdrawn post-1992 whose sponsors were public or union funds, there is
a neg~tive valuation effect (a statistically significant decrease in Tobin's
Q), in contrast to proposals withdrawn before 1992, where the valuation
effect (change in Tobin's Q) was positive, albeit insignificant. 134
Chidambaran and Woidtke interpret the data as indicating that the
1992 proxy reforms provided institutional investors with excessive
bargaining power such that they became able to pressure managers to
accept non-value-maximizing proposals. This is because the firms whose
proposals were withdrawn after 1992 had lower levels of management
stock ownership than the firms whose proposals were withdrawn before
1992, and they reason that institutional pressure to adopt non-value-
maximizing proposals will be more effective where management does not
have significant voting power. 135 Hence, Chidambaran and Woidtke also
reach a conclusion diametrically opposed to that of Opler and Sokobin
132 Id. at ms. 10-12, tbl. 5.
133 Chidambaran & Woidtke, supra note 7.
134 Id. at 16-17, 28 tbl. 6.
135 Id. at 3, 19. These data suggest that negotiated compromises were more likely to occur
when proposals were value-maximizing propositions before 1992 than post-1992. Chidambaran and
Woidtke buttress this contention with an examination of the subset of proposals for which they can
classify whether management adopted the withdrawn proposal as-is or whether the parties reached a
compromise on the proposal's substance; they find that post-1992, proposals accepted as-is had a
significant negative impact on firm value, and before 1992, compromises had a significant positive
effect, id. at 18-19, but they do not indicate how representative, or what percentage, of the full sample
this subsample is. Their conclusions are consistent with those of Stephen Choi, who, also finding that
after the 1992 proxy reforms, unions and religious groups increased their sponsorship of proposals and
the proposal targets had higher levels of insider ownership, concludes that post-I 992 proposal sponsors
were more interested in using the proxy process as a bargaining tool than as a way to maximize
shareholder welfare. Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact ofthe 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms, 16
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233,266 (2000).
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concerning behind-the-scenes activism by institutional investors, that it is
not a shareholder wealth-enhancing activity.
The conventional explanation of the findings of positive performance
effects from successful negotiations and insignificant effects from proposal
submissions is that managers negotiate only when proposals are value-
maximizing, and shareholders bid the price up in anticipation of the
proposal's implementation. Proposals that are submitted, in this view, are
those that management recognizes as non-value-maximizing, and therefore
not worthy of negotiation. There is no market reaction to submissions
because, although the proposal is negatively assessed, it is not expected to
pass (or not expected to be implemented by management if passed). To
reconcile the finding of a negative reaction to a proposal sponsored by
institutional investors in Gillan and Starks's study, the value-maximization
explanation needs to contend that the market believes a non-value-
maximizing proposal might be adopted if sponsored by an institutional
investor. The finding of negative performance effects from negotiations in
the studies of Crutchley et al. and Chidambaran and Woidtke, however,
cannot be rationalized by this explanation, since their findings suggest that,
to the contrary, management negotiates over non-value-maximizing
proposals.
A more helpful explanation that better reconciles the paradoxical
finding of positive and negative performance effects from negotiated
agreements (private activism) and insignificant effects from shareholder
proposals on the same issues is a screening explanation of management
behavior. In a context in which investors are not informed about
management quality while managers are informed,136 shareholder proposal
negotiations can provide investors with a means to screen the high- from
the low-quality managers. From this perspective, the positive (negative)
price effects from private activism are not indicia of a positive (negative)
assessment of the subject matter of the activism (i.e., whether it is value-
maximizing), but rather, indicate investors' assessment of management's
quality, that it will be (will not be) responsive to shareholders' concerns
over the need to improve firm value.
136 There is a large economics literature on adverse selection (markets with products of
varying quality which cannot be observed prior to purchase); for a good textbook introduction to
screening (also termed self-selection) and signalling models in which markets overcome adverse
selection; the difference in model depends on which party, the uninformed or informed, acts first. See.
e.g., DAVID KREps, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 625-652 (1990). The argument in the
text draws from this literature, but it is not a rigorous application because it is not an exact fit with a
screening model. Although the uninformed act first - investors target management with proposals -
they do not offer different discrete contracts, as in a screening model, and managements instead sort
themselves by their different responses to the uniformly offered "contract," a more active role
associated with signalling models in which the informed move first. I believe the analogy is apt despite
the imprecision because under plausible conditions both screening and signalling models produce
outcomes in which high- and low-quality managers are identified (that is, separating equilibria).
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The difference in stock price reaction to proposals and negotiations in
this explanation is a function of learning-infonnation updating
concerning management quality by the market from the occurrence of
shareholder activism-rather than the market's assessment of the value of
the underlying activism's objectives. The market views nonproxy
(negotiated settlement) activism as a screen for detennining that
management quality is high: because management was sufficiently
responsive to the institutional investor's concern that it was willing to
withdraw its proposal, investors update their evaluation of management
quality as less prone to self-entrenchment and more apt to improve
perfonnance. If an institutional investor's proposal is submitted instead of
withdrawn, it could provide negative infonnation regarding management's
quality, as it would indicate management's non-responsiveness to
shareholder concerns, or low quality. But failure to negotiate, in this
scenario, need not provide new infonnation, because the market will have
already perceived the management of targeted finns to be of low quality
given prior poor perfonnance. Hence, we would intuitively not expect
studies consistently to observe a negative stock price effect upon proposal
submissions.
The infonnation-revealing story of the stock price effects of
negotiations raises several questions. First, why would the reaction to a
proposal enable investors to screen management's quality? The
infonnation concerning management's response to shareholder activism is
infonnative in this scenario because it enables investors to screen, from
among poorly perfonning finns, those with lower-quality management
because it would be more expensive for low-quality, rather than high-
quality managers to be responsive. This is an equilibrium story only if it is
costly for lower-quality managers to mimic higher-quality managers by
negotiating proposal withdrawals. Successful negotiation will clearly be a
more costly strategy for lower-quality managers to undertake compared to
higher-quality managers when the subject is a proposal to eliminate a
defensive tactic: the fonner type of managers are more likely to be the
target of a hostile bid and replaced. This factor makes the high-quality
managers' action not easily mimicked by poor-quality management even
for proposal categories where the impact will not be as clearly disparate
across managerial quality: since most finns do riot experience only one
type of proposal, 137 lower-quality managers cannot negotiate over only one
type of proposal while refusing to negotiate over proposals on takeover
defenses.
A second question raised by the infonnation-updating explanation of
137 For example, of firms that have adopted confidential voting, two-thirds of those receiving
a proposal to eliminate a defensive tactic received another type of proposal at the same meeting.
Romano, supra note II.
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the stock price effects of negotiated agreements is why managers do not
signal quality on their own, instead of waiting to react to action by
uninformed investors (shareholder proposals). The response is that the
explanation is not offered as the sole means by which adverse selection
problems in equity markets are resolved. Management may signal an
investment's quality by other means, for instance, through the choice of
capital structure, auditor selection, stock ownership, or underpricing of an
initial public offering.138 Rather, shareholder proposals can induce further
(and possibly more precise) sorting of managerial quality to the extent that
poor performance diminishes the credibility of other signals managers
provide regarding their quality. Managers might not expect shareholders to
reassess their quality negatively upon poor performance, especially if this
were an industry-wide phenomenon, and therefore they might not believe
that further signalling was necessary. Such perceptions by managers would
be consistent with the fact that not all poorly performing firms are targeted
by institutional investors. In this scenario, a shareholder proposal reveals
information to managers regarding the market's updated perception of
their quality, and thereby evokes further sorting in response.
It should be noted that all of the studies finding uniform positive price
effects associated with private negotiations had sample periods ending in
1993. The negative reaction to private activism in the mid-1990s suggests
that the self selection induced by such activity now indicates low rather
than high management quality. The change in the identity of proposal
sponsors - from public pension funds to union funds - in conjunction with
some change in the type of proposal - an increase in proposals on
executive compensation - could explain the changed market perception of
the negotiation process.139 In addition, the cumulation of experience
138 See, e.g., Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977) (stock ownership); Stephen A. Ross,
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23
(\ 977) (capital structure); Sheridan Titman & Brett Trueman, Information Quality and the Valuation of
New Issues, 8 J. ACCT. & ECON. 159 (1986) (auditor selection); Ivo Welch, Seasoned Offerings,
Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 44 J. FIN. 421 (1989) (underpricing
of initial public offerings). There are numerous signalling models directed at explaining underpricing
of initial public offerings, and the empirical support is mixed. See, e.g., Narasimhan Jegadeesh et aI.,
An Empirical Investigation of IPO Returns and Subsequent Equity Offerings, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 153
(1993). The signalling literature typically considers the need for management to signal the quality of
the firm's projects rather than the quality of the managersthemselves, but in practice it is often difficult
to distinguish between these replacement of managers does not always resolve a firm's difficulties and
thus this Article does not attempt to do so either.
139 There could be different information provided to investors from union activism if
management, in exchange for termination of a corporate governance campaign by a union, capitulates
to employment-related demands that it would otherwise reject. Then while a failed negotiation would
indicate to the market that management had opted not to engage in compromising tactics, a withdrawn
proposal would indicate that management had entered into a disadvantageous labor deal, and
successful negotiations should produce a negative, not positive, price effect when the activist is a union
as opposed to a pension fund. There is some anecdotal evidence that prolonged union campaigns are
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indicating that past negotiations did not improve performance might lead
investors to reassess the significance of proposals as a screen: private
negotiated activism, in this information-updating scenario, is viewed as
redirecting management's time and energy away from improving
performance to less useful activities, and hence makes it more likely that
low-, rather than high-quality managers respond to investor initiatives. In
these changed circumstances, the costly screen provided by high-quality
managers that low-quality managers cannot duplicate is the absence of a
response. This is plausible if a failure to respond to activism provides
information to' takeover bidders that the firm has a set of dissatisfied
institutional investors who would be receptive to a bid, for low-quality
managers have more at risk from being the subject of a hostile bid than
high-quality ones.
Alternatively, if the subsample of firms experiencing negative
valuation effects in the post-1992 samples had been targets of proposal
negotiations previously, then the negative effect could be explained as a
downward revision of prior beliefs regarding managerial quality because
shareholders had to come back with additional proposals. The downward-
revision hypothesis is provided support by a study of proxy proposals by
Andrew Prevost and Ramesh Rao, which subdivided firms between those
receiving proposals sponsored by institutional investors known to engage
in pre-submission negotiations, such as CalPERS, and those receiving
proposals from other public fund investors, and then subdivided the
activist-investor targets between those receiving proposals over more than
one year and those receiving proposals only once.140 Not only do Prevost
on occasion successful in obtaining management accommodation. For example, the Amalgamated
Clothing and Textile Workers Union's corporate campaign against J.P. Stevens, which was part of its
efforts to organize the company's workforce, succeeded in getting management to bargain with the
union, as evidenced by a settlement term in which the union promised not to engage in further
corporate campaign tactics. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate
Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1018,1033 (1998). Bolstering
a differential information explanation is the fact that, in contrast to public pension funds which
typically have substantial holdings in their targeted firms, union funds often hold the minimally
necessary number of shares to be eligible to submit a proposal under the SEC rule, see, e.g., IRRC,
Plummeting Stock Prices Are Forcing Shareholders to Withdraw Proposals, 12 CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS 30 (Feb. 23,2001). This indicates that the motivation for union activism is
not to improve the performance of an existing investment portfolio. But most union proposals are not
sponsored in the context of labor disputes. Moreover, managements did not initially enter into
negotiations with union proposal sponsors, which explains, at least in part, the increase in the share of
proposals sponsored by unions after 1992 reported by Choi, supra note 133. In recent years,
management has begun to negotiate with unions. See, e.g., IRRC, Update on Union Funds, 11
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS 17 (Feb. 4, 2000). To the extent that unions make up a larger
percentage of the sponsors of the withdrawn proposals in the post-I 992 subsample in the Chidambaran
and Woidtke study, the difference in information content is a possible explanation of their finding of a
negative valuation effect from proposal withdrawals. This interpretation would enable the information-
updating explanation to reconcile all of the activism studies' disparate performance effects.,
140 Andrew K. Prevost & Ramesh P. Rao, Of What Value Are Shareholder Proposals
Sponsored by Public Pension Funds?, 73 J. Bus. 177 (2000).
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and Rao find a significant negative price effect for the 32 proposals
submitted by the activist funds and no significant effect for the overall
sample, but they also find that the negative wealth effects last for much
wider event intervals for the 10 multiple year proposal firms than for the
22 single proposal firms. 141
Admittedly, the Prevost and Rao study's sample size is small. But the
findings are entirely consistent with the information-updating explanation.
The returns are significant only for proposals submitted by institutions
whose pre-proposal activism is highly visible. These are situations in
which the proposal's appearance on the proxy indicates to the market that
management was not responsive to the investor, and the information effect
is magnified for firms receiving multiple proposals.
Prevost and Rao' s data suggest that in instances of multiple
submissions, investors update their beliefs concerning management
quality. Investors conclude that a persistently unresponsive management
will be unwilling or unable to undertake necessary steps to improve firm
value. That is, investors learn that the targets are firms with low-quality
management as the managers have not learned from their "first exposure"
to institutions' proposals how to avert future submissions.142 Thus, they
lower their expected valuation of the firm's future cash flows.
All of Prevost and Rao' s findings of negative significance are
independent of proposal category, further corroborating the information-
updating hypothesis. Moreover, the expectation of poor performance due
to low management quality offered as the interpretation of the more
negative statistical results for multiple-proposal firms is a rational
expectation: that is, it is in fact borne out by subsequent data. Prevost and
Rao report that both long-run stock returns and accounting measures of
long-term performance decline significantly for the multiple-proposal
firms, but not for the single-proposal firms. 143 In short, management that
does not respond to institutional investors' concerns-managers of firms
where proposals are actually submitted for a vote-are conjectured by
investors to be managers of low quality, and that assessment is confirmed
when a second proposal is submitted. And the screen is accurate: the
longer term subsequent performance of firms with such managers is worse.
Finally, where the Carleton et al. study's results of significance differ
from those of the shareholder proposal studies,l44 a screening explanation
141 Jd. at 188-92.
142 Seeid.atI93.
143 Jd. at 194-99.
144 Carleton et a1. 's varying findings of statistical significance based on the content of TIAA-
CREF's activism can be reconciled with the empirical literature on the underlying govemance devices.
The finding that TIAA-CREF's efforts to increase board diversity has a negative impact on
performance is consistent with one study that identified value-maximizing boards (boards chosen by
leveraged buyout firms going public) as having fewer female directors than the average board. See
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of institutional activism seems especially apt at reconciling the differences,
compared to a value-maximizing explanation of such behavior. Carleton et
al. found that private negotiations involving restrictions on poison pilIs had
a positive impact, compared to the negative impact of antitakeover
proposals (which were primarily poison-pilI-rescission proposals) in the
Smith and Gillan and Starks studies, and the marginally significant
negative result in the Del Guercio and Hawkins study. Although Carleton
et al. 's result is consistent with the initial empirical studies that found a
negative wealth effect of poison pills, it is also consistent with a
management-quality-updating explanation: Smith, GilIan and Starks, and
Del Guercio and Hawkins, who do not find positive price effects, are
examining submitted proposals whereas Carleton et aI., who find positive
effects, are not. Thus the management of the firms in Carleton et al.'s
study could have been perceived as more responsive to investor concerns
and thus less prone to entrenchment in the use of a poison pill defense,
than those in the other three studies. In addition, CaIPERS's activity in
early years concentrated on defensive tactics, and this is the period for
which Crutchley et al. found that its activism had a positive price effect. It
is, however, inconsistent with Smith's finding of a negative effect from
defensive tactic activism by CaIPERS, although Smith's result was for an
earlier time period than that covered by the Carleton et al. study.
The value-maximizing explanation could also explain the difference
between the results on defensive tactic activism in Carleton et al. and the
shareholder proposal studies on the rationale that, in contrast to other
institutions, TIAA-CREF accurately targeted firms that would not be
benefited by takeover defenses, and all institutional targeting is aggregated
in studies finding no price effect. It is more difficult for it to explain
satisfactorily the finding that not all of TIAA-CREF's negotiations
produce positive effects. If, as the value-maximizing explanation
maintains, management only negotiates over proposals that will improve
performance, then either all of TIAA-CREF's negotiations and not only
poison pilI negotiations, should be positively assessed or management
should not have entered into negotiations over the proposals that were not
value-maximizing (those for which the price effect was not positive). The
Robert Gertner & Steven N. Kaplan, The Value-Maximizing Board (Dec. 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation). The studies relating board composition to
perfonnance do not examine directors' personal attributes of gender and race, the object of TIAA-
CREF's proposal, but the failure to find a positive effect on perfonnance in the more general board
studies of director independence is consistent with the finding that TIAA-CREF's board proposals do
not increase target finn value, because increasing director diversity typically would be achieved by the
addition of independent directors under TIAA-CREF's policy. The finding of insignificance for
confidential voting adoptions is consistent with the finding that the practice does not significantly
affect voting outcomes. See Romano, supra note II. The finding of a positive impact for negotiations
on poison pills is consistent with the results of the earliest empirical studies of negative price reactions
to pill adoptions, as well as with a signalling explanation, which is discussed in the text.
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mixed results in the Carleton et al. study can be reconciled with the value-
maximizing explanation of negotiations by maintaining that two of the
three foci of TIAA-CREF's activism have very little impact on
performance. This is consistent with this Article's analysis of institutional
activism and bolsters this Article's conclusion that such activity needs to
be reassessed.
I have elaborated and emphasized the information-updating
explanation over the value-maximization explanation of the findings in
studies of nonproxy (negotiated) activism because it has greater
explanatory power, particularly with regard to the finding that private
activism in recent years has had a negative effect. It reconciles more of the
disparities across the entire set of shareholder activism studies than does
the value-maximizing explanation. Interpreting the price effect as
information on management quality explains why a particular type of
proposal may have a price effect when privately raised with management
but not when appearing in a proxy, and why that effect might differ when
management negotiates with a different type of institution. The positive
price effect relates to management's quality, not any specific action that is
being undertaken to improve performance. At the same time, the
information-updating explanation is consistent with the finding that
targeted firms' long-term performance does not improve significantly,
whatever the form of activism. Even a high-quality management will not
improve performance if it must direct its time and effort to the
implementation of shareholders' proposals that have no effect on
performance.
4. Structural Changes Following Shareholder Activism
In addition to examining the impact of activism on performance,
some studies investigate whether firms engage in corporate restructurings
or other governance reforms after they have been targeted by institutional
investors. The rationale is that the undertaking of significant structural
change by firms after a proxy targeting is an alternative means by which to
gauge the success of shareholder activism. The assumption is that such
changes will eventually improve performance. This scenario would
provide a concrete basis for the information-updating explanation of the
positive returns to nonproxy activism: The market expects a more
responsive management to adopt policies that will increase shareholder
wealth, and the anticipation of such action explains the positive returns. It
would, at best, provide only tangential support for the value-maximizing
explanation of positive returns to nonproxy activism, because the price
effect is supposed to be measuring the subject of the negotiations. The link
for that explanation would be that the outcome of the negotiated
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agreements, such as a board composition change or a takeover defense
rescission, produced the subsequent restructurings.
There is considerable divergence across studies concerning whether
targeted firms make significant structural changes, such as firing the CEO
or selling substantial assets. The differences would appear to be related to
the studies' variation in findings concerning stock price performance.
Karpoff et aI., who found no stock price effects, find little evidence of
policy changes in direct response to a proxy vote, and, in particular, that
CEO turnover is not related to receipt of a shareholder proposal. 145 The
studies finding subsample positive stock price effects, however, tend to
find an increase in the level of asset divestitures of the targeted firms. For
instance, Smith finds no significant difference in CEO turnover in targeted
firms compared to industry and performance control groups, but
significantly higher sales of assets by the targeted firms. 146 And Opler and
Sokobin find a decrease in CEO turnover but an increase in asset sales
after activist targeting. 147
The fit is less exact with the results in Del Guercio and Hawkins: they
find significantly more newspaper reports of restructuring activity and
increased employee, but not increased CEO, turnover in targeted firms
compared to an industry and performance control group as well as for
various subsamples, and increased CEO and employee turnover for the
board proposal subsample, but neither the full sample nor the subsamples
experiencing significant restructuring activity had significant positive
returns. 148 Mark Huson also finds that CalPERS targets engage in more
asset divestitures than a set of control firms over three years subsequent to
the targeting, although the control group is quite imprecise (the control
firms are either smaller or better performers than the CalPERS targets); he
does not, however, investigate the price effects of the targeting. 149
145 See Karpoff et aI., supra note 21, at 388.
146 See Smith, supra note 23, at 241, 248.
147 See QPLER & SOKOBIN, supra note 21, at 17-18.
148 See Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 308-313. Because the positive returns for
the CalPERS subsample disappear when Avon Products, a takeover target, is excluded from the
subsample, this is not a true positive return subsample. In addition, there is no direct connection
between the takeover bid for Avon Products and the institutional activism under study.
149 HUSON, supra note 27, at 13 (studying 18 finns targeted by CalPERS over 1990-92).
Huson finds that there is a more significant price effect of the announcement of divestitures and other
events, such as acquisitions and joint venture agreements, for the shareholder-proposal targets than the
control finns, and in particular, that the effects were negative for such events announced before the
CalPERS targeting and positive for those announced after the targeting./d. at 15-18. He concludes that
these data evince that CalPERS's activism improves finn decisionmaking./d. at 19. This conclusion is
quite tenuous. In addition to the difficulty of attributing events occurring over a three year period after
targeting to that targeting, he does not provide any specific infonnation concerning the divestitures that
produced a negative effect three years prior to targeting compared to the divestitures producing the
positive effect after targeting, which would increase one's confidence in attributing the difference to
CaIPERS's intervention, as opposed to characteristics of the divestitures, or change in the business
environment for divestitures over the time periods in question.
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Finally it should be noted that while TIAA-CREF's actlVlsm was
successful-Carleton et al. find that virtually all of the firms targeted by
TIAA-CREF adapted their governance structures to accommodate the
fund's objectivel50-the changes in TIAA-CREF-targeted firms reported
by Carleton et al. are less substantial than the structural changes examined
in other studies, such as CEO turnover and asset dispositions. The
responses to TIAA-CREF's activism consist of refinements to poison pill
plans, establishment of confidential voting, and commitments to increase
minority and female representation on boards. It is improbable that these
modest adjustments to corporate policy affect performance by leading to
the more substantive responses found in the other studies, a conclusion
supported by the absence of positive significance for most of the TIAA-
CREF negotiated settlements. The sole positive price effects subsample,
the poison pill negotiations, raise the prospect of potential premiums, or
future CEO change or asset sales if no bid is forthcoming, after a pill's
relaxation. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be tested because
Carleton et al. do not investigate whether the TIAA-CREF-targeted firms
subsequently experienced any restructurings.
The suggestion of a three-way association among positive price
effects, shareholder activism, and subsequent structural changes, is
consistent with the research examining the impact on performance of the
most substantial form of investor activism: proxy fights for control.
Studies of proxy contests consistently find more favorable effects from this
form of investor activism than do studies of shareholder proposals. The
stock price reactions to proxy fights are significantly positive (whether or
not the dissidents actually win).151 Moreover, the contests have significant
firm-level consequences: firms that are the subject of proxy fights for
control typically experience top management turnover regardless of
outcome and they are often sold or liquidated shortly thereafter. 152 This
result-the high frequency of subsequent acquisition, restructuring or CEO
change-in all likelihood accounts for the increase in value created by the
initiation of a proxy fight compared to a proxy proposal. In fact, the most
recent and most comprehensive study of proxy fights finds that most of the
positive price effects of proxy contests are driven by firms that are
acquired soon after the contest; when there is no acquisition, the gains in
shareholder wealth from the proxy fight are sustained only by firms whose
CEO is replaced.153 And, of course, the literature is replete with the
150 See Carleton et aI., supra note 23, at 1336, 1343 (noting that agreements were reached
over 95% of the time and that targets complied with TlAA-CREF's request in over 85% of the
agreements).
lSI See supra note 20.
152 See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 20.
153 Mulherin & Poulsen, supra note 20, at 280, 299, 303. DeAngelo and DeAngelo also
concluded that the bulk of the gains were from subsequent acquisitions. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo,
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positive effect on target shareholder wealth from acquisitions. 1s4
From a cost-benefit perspective, it is not surprising that more
restructuring occurs after proxy fights than after shareholder proposals,
and that, accordingly, the performance effect of proxy fights is greater than
that of proxy proposals. Proxy fights are a far more expensive form of
shareholder activism than shareholder proposals and restructuring is
typically the contestants' objective. The insignificant effect on
performance of shareholder proposals may relate to the low-level efforts of
investors engaging in such activism, ISS compared to proxy fights. But
while it is true that proxy proposal activism is inexpensive compared to
proxy contests, the insignificant performance results of shareholder
activism are, in my judgment, due to its objectives: independent boards,
compensation limits, confidential voting and, albeit more ambiguously,
poison pill rescissions, are not only inexpensive actions to undertake
compared to the goals of a proxy fight or corporate takeover (division sales
and top management change) but they are also corporate governance
devices that do not have any measurable effect on share value.
II. Improving the Impact of Corporate Governance Activism
The striking absence of evidence that shareholder activism improves
targeted firms' performance raises the core question whether institutions
should reassess their shareholder proposal agenda, in order to manage their
resources more effectively. This Article takes a two-pronged approach to
the issue. First, it suggests a mechanism of internal control, whereby fund
boards would engage in periodic review of their staffs shareholder-
activism programs to identify the most fruitful governance objectives.
Second, it advocates increasing the incentive to undertake internal
reevaluations by proposing elimination or substantial reduction of the
subsidy of proxy proposal sponsorship unless a proposal achieves
substantial voting support.
A. Internal Controls: Refocusing Activist Programs
One means of reducing the likelihood that shareholder activism is a
non-value-maximizing activity is to improve the quality of decision-
making by institutional investors by encouraging implementation of
comprehensive, formal internal reviews of corporate governance
supra note 20.
154 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 119, 122 (1992) (summarizing literature on target returns).
ISS See Black, supra note 8; cf Carleton et aI., supra note 23. at 1357 (concluding
shareholder activism is not a substitute for takeovers but "a way that institutions spend more limited
resources to accomplish much more modest goals").
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programs. Such reviews should include an evaluation of the empirical
research relating to the objective of contemplated proposals or private
negotiations, as well as the voting outcome of previously submitted
proposals. The review should be forwarded to the fund board and not
simply the officers or employees supervising activism programs. This
would enable a fund board to identify better what activity is worthwhile,
facilitating the fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations to fund
beneficiaries. A formal mechanism of reporting on a fund's activities and
their effectiveness would put fund trustees and fund managers on a more
equal footing and thus lessen the possibility that better-informed managers
could rationalize an agenda to a board in terms of good corporate
governance practices that consists, in fact, of non-value-enhancing
proposals.
The formal review of corporate governance activities should also be
incorporated in the fund's annual report or statement sent to beneficiaries
or holders of fund shares. As a publicly available document, it will be of
use to fund participants willing to expend the effort to monitor fund
managers' efforts at enhancing the value of their portfolio. In addition,
legislators and taxpayers who finance public pensions will also be better
able to identify inappropriate expenditures that could affect the funding of
plan assets for which they are legally liable.
What should be a fund's response to the proposed review? At
minimum, proxy proposals that have a negative impact upon performance
given the literature on corporate governance devices, such as those
involving executive compensation limits, ought to be scrapped in favor of
those whose effect is at least arguably ambiguous, such as, proposals to
relax takeover defenses. Such a policy will also require the fund's staff to
develop firm-specific knowledge to engage in activism: just as the
empirical literature finds that the stock price effect of takeover defenses
varies with firm characteristics, such as board composition and firm
size,156 proposals to eliminate those defenses would, accordingly, be more
beneficial for some firms than others. If a fund does not possess adequate
firm-specific knowledge, proposals whose impact is highly firm-
dependent, such as takeover defense rescissions, ought to be discouraged.
In fact, some institutional investors are aware of this problem and have
adapted their governance activities accordingly. For instance, Del Guercio
and Hawkins note that the heavily-indexed New York City pension fund
does not sponsor poison pill proposals because they "require too much
company-specific knowledge."157
156 Brickley et a!., supra note 70 (negative effect for firms with insider boards); M. Andrew
Fields & Janet M. Todd, Firm Size. Antitakeover Charter Amendments. and the Effect of State
Antitakeover Legislation, 21 MANAGERIAL FIN. 35 (1995) (negative effect for small firms).
157 Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 305-06.
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Similarly, proxy proposals that receive little support from other
investors (which not surprisingly invariably are those whose substantive
objectives produce the least positive impact on firm value) should be
reevaluated, with an eye to their elimination. The reasoning for such a
criterion is that support levels are an excellent proxy for the judgment of
other informed investors that the proposal is in their interest. Hence,
proposals that obtain a higher level of voting support have a higher
probability of being those that maximize share value. 15S Only if
shareholders' beliefs are biased concerning the value of a specific type of
proposal, would the level of voting support not be an accurate proxy for
the proposal's impact on performance.
Given the large number and diversity of institutional investors and
their information sources, however, systematic errors across investors over
proposal valuation effects is simply not a plausible scenario. The more
plausible assumption is that shareholder mistakes on the value of a
particular governance device are randomly distributed. In such a scenario,
with a large number of voting shareholders, investor errors will cancel out
and the proportion of yes votes is the best estimate of the proposal's value.
A case in point involves proposals on defensive tactics. Jamil
Aboumeri, for instance, notes that it is surprising that shareholders vote in
large numbers to rescind poison pills despite his research showing
substantial benefits from those defenses. 159 The literature on the impact of
poison pills on takeovers is, however, ambiguous and, in particular, the
effect appears to vary considerably with firm characteristics. 160 It is
therefore altogether reasonable for investors to believe that the removal of
a pill will be beneficial for some firms, and to support such proposals,
notwithstanding Aboumeri's claim. There is, however, a potential non-
random error in this context which would affect the significance
attributable to voting results. If uninformed shareholders believe that the
institutional sponsors of proposals on defensive tactics are informed about
the relevant firm-level characteristics, and the sponsors are not so
informed, then the proposals might attract more votes than justified at
specific firms. The comprehensive review procedure would mitigate such a
problem, for as institutions conscientiously engage in activist program
reevaluations, they will thereafter undertake such proposals only when
they have the requisite firm-specific knowledge.
Periodic program review is also important because shareholder
activism in the proxy process is not costless, even though it is certainly
158 Cf Schwab & Thomas, supra note 137, at 1082-83 (arguing that other shareholders are
more likely to support union-sponsored proposals that have potential to improve performance than
those concerned with labor-related interests).
159 Aboumeri, supra note 78, at 5.
160 See. e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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inexpensive compared to activism involving control changes. For example,
CalPERS estimates the annual cost of its activism program at $500,000
(which is .002% of the fund's domestic holdings). 161 Del Guercio and
Hawkins indicate that the activist pension funds in their study similarly
spent less than half of a basis point per year on their corporate governance
programs, with an expenditure range from $50,000 to $1 million. 162 They
also state that TIAA-CREF spends annually $1 million or .002% of assets
on its corporate governance program. 163 Other corporate governance
strategies, such as voting against management proposals and board
nominees of poorly-performing firms, are far cheaper to implement than
an activist agenda; for instance, one estimate of the annual cost of a "just
vote no" program is $100,000.164
Given the cost differential between active and passive mechanisms of
monitoring management and the ineffectiveness of shareholder activism at
improving corporate performance, from a fiduciary standpoint, fund
managers ought to have to justify program expenditures to their boards.
Identifying which specific corporate structures or processes enhance share
value by reference to readily available data, rather than wishful thinking
concerning their effects, will improve the quality of decision-making and
should produce corporate governance programs which are consonant with
the funds' fiduciary obligations. Although it could be contended that the
expected decline in proposals due to adoption of such a thorough review
process would reduce the information obtained regarding management
quality from a proposal submission indicating failed negotiation, in fact,
the effect, in all likelihood, would be heightened. Funds will shift to
proposals that are more likely to obtain higher voting support, such as
defensive tactic rescissions, and hence ones more costly for low-quality
managers to negotiate over.
The details of an appropriately enhanced system of internal control
for a shareholder activism program have not been minutely specified. The
reasons are two-fold. First, because the benefit of some corporate
governance mechanisms vary with firm-specific characteristics, too-
minutely specified criteria would freeze a fund's ability to respond
differentially to varying situations. Second, given the dynamic evolution of
the corporate form and governance devices, it would not be prudent to
advocate the termination of all corporate governance activism. Instead, a
filter mechanism regarding the proposals the fund submits ought to be
implemented, which takes account of the literature but which is
161 See Smith, supra note 23, at 245.
162 Del Guercio & Hawkins, supra note 3, at 328.
163 Id. at 328 n.4.
164 See Joseph Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians
Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857, 911-12 (1993).
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sufficiently fluid to be able to adapt to new findings and circumstances.
Pension fund boards should find implementation of the proposed
review process sufficiently desirable to do so voluntarily as a good
management practice. But it might well be difficult for boards to evaluate
their programs' efficacy, as they are not likely to possess the requisite
expertise. Inability to evaluate an activism program effectively, in turn,
might lead to hesitancy in adopting the proposed formal review process or
implementing it effectively.
A potentially more important problem for implementation is a fund
board that is subject to political pressure itself: board members are often
political appointees or elected officials, who may support an activist
agenda favored by constituents, and be led to place less weight on
concerns over portfolio value than would be other fiduciaries. 165
Politicization of a fund board would greatly attenuate the incentive to
undertake the proposed review. In such cases, implementing the review
procedure may well be in the interest of the fund managers, for it could
provide political cover for a manager focused on maximizing the value of
portfolio firms from a politicized board whose members are instead
interested in implementing political and social investment objectives.
Politicization has been a problem, for instance, for the CalPERS staff.
Politicians on the fund's board recently advanced an investment policy
opposed by the staff for financial reasons, tobacco stock divestment, and
the staff recommended amending proposed divestiture legislation
supported by the State Treasurer, a fund board member, to include
indemnification for "board members, money managers and others
connected with the fund from potential liabilities" from implementing the
policy if the bill were enacted.166 Indeed, the political composition of the
CalPERS board is considered to affect "every single activity" of the fund,
"from the benefits side to investment policy to corporate governance."167
To the extent that the source of non-value-maximizing activism is fund
boards and not fund managers, it would be in the managers' self- interest
to implement the proposed review procedure that provides external
evaluations to the fund board, as it would be a shield against potential
fiduciary liability.
There are a number of possible avenues for achieving widespread
adoption of adequate internal control practices despite deficiencies in
expertise or incentives within a fund's administration, the most promising
being the promulgation of good practice standards by industry
165 See Romano, supra note 16.
166 Joel Chernoff, CalPERS Mulls Political Issues, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 1,2000,
al 1.
167 Joel Chernoff, CalPERS Tilts Toward Labor, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May I, 2000,
at 3.
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associations. If the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) or
the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the trade groups for public
pension fund officials and private mutual funds, respectively, for example,
were to adopt good practice guidelines that included comprehensive
evaluations of shareholder activism programs, this would have a salutary
impact on individual fund practices. External pressure generated by
reputable organizations' recommendation of a serious review process
could mitigate political pressures on board members to not conform to the
practice. It would surely be a source of support to fund managers seeking
to fulfill their fiduciary obligations against a politicized board
The ClI and national union organizations such as the AFL-CIO,
which have been active promoters and coordinators of the corporate
governance movement, could also perform such a guidance function. In
addition, private organizations, including business trade organizations such
as the Business Roundtable, the National Association of Corporate
Directors and the Conference Board, the corporate bar, stock exchanges
and public accounting firms, could be recruited to formulate standards for
shareholder activism programs. All of these business private organizations
have already been involved in varying degrees in devising
recommendations for corporate governance standards for boards of
directors and audit committees.168
The involvement of private sector organizations in the establishment
of good practices is important because government entities are rarely as
knowledgeable as private organizations regarding the best institutional
procedures. The gap in expertise between regulators and the regulated is
well illustrated by what has occurred in the establishment of international
capital standards for banks. In the most recent international capital
standard adopted for market risk, banking regulators have acknowledged
that they lag significantly behind the banking industry in risk measurement
expertise: they adopted an internal model approach to the calculation of
market risk, in which the bank's, rather than the regulator's, model
estimates the value at risk in the bank's portfolio and therefore establishes
the amount of capital required. 169
An alternative route for attaining widespread formal review of fund
activism is to mandate the review through a certification requirement:
168 For a list of business and bar organizations that have produced corporate governance
standards for boards see Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 50, at 1288-89 & nn. 21-22. The New York
Stock Exchange and National Association for Securities Dealers, in response to SEC concerns, created
the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, which
issued a report in February 1999 with recommendations for improving audit committees, and
accounting finns have followed up with statements of audit committee standards. E.g.,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, AUDIT COMMITTEES: BEST PRACTICES FOR PROTECTING
SHAREHOLDER INTERESTS (1999); KPMG, SHAPING THE AUDIT COMMITTEE AGENDA (1999).
169 Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R pts. 208,225 (2000).
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funds could be required to obtain a letter from an independent third party,
such as the firm's auditor, on a periodic basis, certifying that the institution
has undertaken a comprehensive review of its activism program. l7O
Certification of such a process is altogether reasonable, and in accord with
current trends in auditing, in particular, the movement to certify processes
rather than transactions or outputs (items that are verifiable quantitatively
and hence the substance of traditional audits).171 Moreover, accounting
firms in recent years have been required to review a variety of qualitative
information concerning firms' internal controls, including information
relating to issues such as year 2000 compliance,l72 and they have
increasingly been marketing their auditing services as "assurance
services," through which they express a willingness to certify matters
beyond financial accounting data during an audit. 173
In addition, a special committee of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) created in 1994 to report on the "current
state and future" of audit and assurance services, defined "assurance
services" as "independent professional services that improve the quality of
information, or its content, for decision makers.,,174 It proposed examples
of assurance services that comport with certification of activism program
reviews: assurance regarding compliance with company policies, and
assurance regarding investment managers' conformity with performance
presentation standards. 175 Quite clearly, evaluation of the effectiveness of a
review of corporate governance programs is no less certifiable by an
auditor than the other nonfinancial matters that auditing firms have
170 To the extent that there is concern that such work could compromise the independence of
the auditor, use of a different public accounting firm could be required. But this work would not appear
to create a significant independence issue as it does not constitute self-review of the auditing function
as do other appraisal and valuation services. See. e.g., ISB Gives Guidance to Auditors on Derivatives
Accounting, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1919, at 3 (Apr. 17, 2000) (discussing interpretation of
Independence Standards Board regarding auditors' provision of assistance on the implementation of
FAS 133, a new standard for accounting for derivatives).
171 See. e.g., KPMG, THE FINANCIAL STATEMENT AUDIT 9 (1999); Anita Dennis, Becoming
a Business Partner: Toward a More Dynamic Internal Audit Department, 183 J. ACCT. 72,74 (1997)
(quoting, "we used to analyze transactions; now we analyze the processes," Robert Brewer, director of
Audits at Praxair, a $4 billion supplier of industrial gases).
172 See Official Releases. Auditing Interpretation . .. Statements of Position 98-4, 98-5 and
98-6, 186 J. ACCT. 95 (July 1998) (discussing auditors' responsibilities regarding year 2000 issues).
173 The websites of several accounting firms refer to their provision of "assurance services"
in conjunction with traditional auditing services. See, e.g., KPMG Global Services at
http://www.kpmg.com/services (last visited April 16,2001) (stating that "KPMG is a leading provider
of assurance, tax and legal, consulting and financial advisory services.... The Assurance practice
helps clients manage risk so they can focus on their core businesses"); Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Health Care Practice, Assurance and Business Advisory Service, at http://www.pwchealth.com (last
visited April 16,2001) (stating that their "global Assurance and Business Advisory Services (ABAS)
offer [clients] a broad range of innovative and cost-effective solutions: We provide Assurance on the
financial performance and operations of your business").
174 AICPA, REpORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ASSURANCE SERVICES (1997),
available at http//www.aicpa.org (last visited Feb. 19,2000).
175 Id.
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undertaken in recent years. Indeed, auditors' experience in such areas
makes them better suited to undertake a certifying function than other
professionals with expertise in the proxy process, such as lawyers and
consulting firms. To the extent that standards of good practices for activist
programs are developed, the accountants could certify whether the fund
was in compliance with such standards, and not simply that it has engaged
in a comprehensive review.
If certification of reviews of activism programs were required by fund
regulators,176 then institutional investors plainly would have to undertake
the necessary evaluative reviews. But the varied identity of proposal
sponsors and potential sponsors renders implementation of a uniform
certification requirement problematic. For example, public pension funds
are regulated by state legislatures,l77 union pension funds are regulated by
the Department of Labor (DoL),178 and mutual funds, which have not been
involved in corporate governance activism but have been encouraged to do
SO,179 are regulated by the SEC.180 Moreover, in the absence of a
promulgated standard of good activism practices, the certification
requirement will not provide very effective protection for fund
beneficiaries, for the independent third party verifies only the undertaking
of a comprehensive review, and not the outcome-the efficacy of the fund's
program. These concerns suggest the need to craft an additional
mechanism to ensure that fund managers' incentives are aligned with
engaging in an investor activism program that maximizes the value of the
fund's portfolio.
B. External Controls: Shifting the Financial Burden ofShareholder
Proposals
Beyond the difficulty of implementing a certification requirement to
ensure compliance with the proposed comprehensive review of activism
programs, there is a further problem with relying solely on internal
176 Accounting regulatory bodies, such as the Government Accounting Standards Board
(GASB) and Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), are not the appropriate locus of authority
for such certification, as their mandates are directed at disclosures of the costs and revenues of firm
output.
177 E.g., Romano, supra note 16, at 800.
178 The DoL's authority over union funds comes from its administration of ERISA, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1000 (1994), and the Taft-Hartley
Act, 29 U.S.C. § I86(c)(5) (1994) (multiemployer plans).
179 See Robert McGough & Pui-Wing Tam, Bogle Urges Role in Corporate Governance,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1999, at C23 (reporting John Bogle, founder of the Vanguard Group, as having
called on mutual funds to "live up to their responsibility of corporate citizenship" and promote better
corporate governance and wield their voting power to oppose management on issues harmful to
shareholders, such as excessive stock options).
180 The SEC's regulatory authority over mutual funds is derived from the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -63 (2000).
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controls to resolve fund beneficiaries' problem that fund activist programs
are not cost-effective. Because the most active funds are public pension
funds that are defined benefit plans, their beneficiaries' payouts are
independent of the funds' endowment. Hence fund managers will not have
powerful incentives to adopt comprehensive evaluations even if some
funds would for fear of adverse signalling, since their beneficiaries are not
as actively monitoring fund performance as are shareholders of mutual
funds. Politicians are also not likely to target fund activism out of concern
about taxpayer expense as the expenditures on such activities are relatively
small and some non-value-maximizing forms of activism may actually
provide political benefits: limiting executive compensation, for instance,
has been a perennial focus of Congressional attention.18l Consequently,
another mechanism is necessary to incentivize public pension fund
managers.
One means of providing an incentive to fund managers to engage in
more cost-effective forms of activism is to eliminate the subsidy of losing
proposals under the SEC's proxy proposal rules. If funds incur the cost of
a losing proposal, then the fund managers will have to scrutinize, on a
continuing basis, the fund's corporate governance program, to determine
which proposals are most likely to attract voting support, because their
cash position will be affected if they do not. Admittedly, the incentive
created by this proposal is low-powered, as fund beneficiaries are not
likely to be able to monitor fund outflows or budget reallocations due to a
poorly performing corporate governance program. But over time the
expenses from losing proposal reimbursements will affect fund
performance, and the fund board will have increased incentives to
intervene. It is in the interest of fund managers to avoid such board action,
as it could have adverse employment repercussions beyond the immediate
curtailment of discretion upon the intervention, and managers anticipating
the possibility of such action will adjust their behavior regarding
shareholder proposals from the outset.
1. Should Proxy Proposals Be Subsidized?
It is textbook economics that parties bearing the full cost of their
actions make better decisions than those that do not. When a party does not
bear the full cost of its activity, it will engage in more of the activity, for in
equating the marginal benefits and costs of the enterprise, a lower level of
benefit from the activity suffices to meet the reduced cost. But under the
shareholder proposal regime, this analysis is generally thought to be
181 See J.R.C. § I62(m) (2001) (eliminating tax deductibility of executive compensation over
$1 million unless performance-based and performance goals set by compensation committee with two
independent directors and approved by shareholders).
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overridden by collective action concerns. Namely, if the cost of action by
an individual shareholder is greater than the shareholder's pro rata benefit,
albeit less than the aggregate gain to all shareholders, the activity will be
under-, rather than over-supplied. The proxy proposal regime assumes that
this is the proper calculation of the costs and benefits of shareholder
proposals.
But where there are private benefits from the shareholder's action,
that is, benefits that accrue solely to the proposal sponsor and that are not
proportionately shared by all shareholders, as is the case with an increase
in firm value, then matching pro-rated costs and benefits will not produce
the optimal level of activity. This is because when costs are allocated
across all shareholders, small private benefits will induce individual action
that does not benefit the shareholders in the aggregate. 182
It is quite probable that private benefits accrue to some investors from
sponsoring at least some shareholder proposals. The disparity in identity of
sponsors-the predominance of public and union funds, which, in contrast
to private sector funds, are not in competition for investor dollars-is
strongly suggestive of their presence. Examples of potential benefits which
would be disproportionately of interest to proposal sponsors are progress
on labor rights desired by union fund managers and enhanced political
reputations for public pension fund managers,183 as well as advancements
in personal employment, the "revolving door" issue for government
employees, whose salaries are considerably lower than the private sector.
It is possible that engaging in activism will enhance an individual's
subsequent job opportunities, analogous to suggestions that prosecutors
bring high profile criminal cases either to further political careers or
partnerships in top criminal defense firms, a charge directed at the white
collar crime prosecutions brought by Rudolph Guliani, a U.S. attorney
who later became Mayor of New York, and others in his office who went
on to prominent law firms. 184 For example, a top official involved in
CaIPERS's corporate governance program, Richard Koppes, left the fund
and joined a law firm that advises management on takeover defenses after
leaving the fund. Because such career concerns-enhancement of political
182 For a discussion of the divergence between private and social gains and the allocation of
costs in proxy contests see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal
Policy towards Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1073, 1092-95 (1990).
183 See, e.g, Paul Jarley & Cheryl L. Maranto, Union Corporate Campaigns: An Assessment,
43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 505 (1990) (discussing relation between use of corporate campaigns and
accomplishment of traditional union goals); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance
of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. LJ. 445, 479-81 (1991) (discussing political
entrepreneurism of public and private pension fund managers active in corporate governance);
Romano, supra note 16, at 801-19, 822 (discussing political interests of, benefits to, and pressures on,
public pension fund managers); Schwab & Thomas, supra note 137, at 1032-34 (discussing labor's
corporate campaigns).
184 DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK 98-102, 302-03 (1995).
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reputations or subsequent employment opportunities-do not provide a
commensurate benefit to private fund managers, we do not find them
engaging in investor activism.
The private benefits implicated in career concerns also have a higher
likelihood of being present in certain classes of proposals than others. For
example, proposals to limit executive compensation and increase board
diversity, appealing to populist sentiment or the political preferences of
some constituents, are more likely to enhance political reputations for fund
managers than confidential voting or takeover defense rescission
proposals. There is far greater media publicity surrounding executive
compensation and minority representation issues, and these proposals
implicate the kinds of social issues on which political reputations can be
d d · d d' 185a vance , In contrast to more mun ane corporate governance eVlces.
This conjecture has plausibility given the far lower level of voting support
for executive compensation and board proposals compared to confidential
voting and defensive tactic proposals by those who have a financial stake
in firms.
A broader set of proposals-all those making managers' lives more
uncomfortable-may provide private benefits to union fund managers
seeking a more accommodating management; these include proposals.
rescinding takeover tactics as well as proposals to limit executive pay and
enhance board independence. But these proposals may also be offered
strategically, to gain support and good will from other investors that is
hoped will carry over to future issues of greater importance to labor.
Although such a carryover is a "private" benefit to the union, it is not a
"private" benefit in the strict sense because any gain from the specific
proposal, such as an increase in stock value from rescission of a poison
pill, is a pro rata gain.
Although it may have had relevance historically, the rationale
advanced for the shareholder proposal rule's subsidization of sponsors'
costs, a collective action problem, has little relevance for contemporary
capital markets, in which a majority of shares is held by institutional
investors. 186 Institutional investors own large blocks of stock and often
cannot sell shares in a poorly-managed firm because their fund is indexed
to a portfolio including that firm. Consequently, they experience far less of
185 For example, the New York City controller and trustee for New York City Employees'
Retirement Funds, when running for the Democratic party nomination for U.S. Senate, highlighted her
fund's sponsorship of proposals for independent directors, in order to obtain "more accountable
management," including elimination of "fat executive compensation plans." Elizabeth Holtzman,
When Management Falls Down on the Job: Pension Funds Can Put Independent Directors on the
Board, WASH. POST, May 26,1992, at A17.
186 See CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 19-20 (1997) (reporting that in 1995, institutional investors held 50% of total U.S.
equity, including 57.2% of the largest 1000 !inns).
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a free rider problem than the individual shareholder whose hypothesized
dilemma motivated adoption of a cost-subsidization regime.
In addition, there are a number of organizations, such as the ClI, the
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and the Institutional
Shareholders Service (ISS),187 that collect and disseminate information to
institutional investors concerning corporate governance issues, which
further reduces the need for a regulatory solution to a hypothesized
collective action problem. The AFL-CIO has also published a detailed set
of voting guidelines for union funds 188 and the possibilities of inexpensive
and widespread dissemination of information through the internet are
already present and potentially enormous. Besides the websites of the
AFL-CIO, CaIPERS, ClI and other organizations that detail their corporate
governance activities, some small activist funds are posting on their
websites how they have voted their proxies and are encouraging use of
their sites to facilitate individual shareholder participation in an activist
agenda. 189
2. Proposed Reform of the Proposal Process
Subsidization is not necessary for active use of the proxy process by
investors and, in fact, it has created perverse incentives for institutional
investors, as the best available data suggest that fund managers are not
using the proposal process in furtherance of the best interest of their
beneficiaries.19o This Article accordingly advocates revising the present
proxy proposal regime to reduce such incentives. It presents three
alternative approaches that would all have the salutary effect of changing
funds' incentives by reducing the subsidy: (i) adoption of a vote cutoff
below which the sponsor must fully reimburse the firm for the cost of
submitting the proposal; (ii) use of a sliding scale of reimbursement
depending on the level of votes obtained; and (iii) shareholder selection of
the extent of subsidization of proposals. The third option is my preferred
approach, but in contrast to the other two proposals, it is at odds with the
mandatory approach of the SEC rules.
187 The ISS is a private consulting finn that provides advice on proxy voting and other
voting services to institutional investors.
188 IRRC, AFL-C/O Proxy Voting Guidelines Could Form Unions into Formidable Voting
Bloc, XVI IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 21 (July-Oct. 1998).
189 See IRRC, New Websites Post Proxy Voting Activity, 10 IRRC CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE HIGHLIGHTS 65 (Apr. 16, 1999) (noting that Domini Social Investments, a socially
responsible investment fund, is posting how its Equity Fund has voted shares in its 400 firms as well as
adding an investor activism center with infonnation on social issue proxy proposals and pennitting
email to CEOs of targeted finns).
190 Individual investors may, of course, also misuse the process if they obtain consumption,
rather than investment, benefits from offering proposals that are not in the interest of the other
shareholders.
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The proposition that shareholders should finance their proposals is not
a novel idea. Commentators writing in the 1980s critiqued the shareholder
proposal subsidy, contending that the mismatched incentives for individual
shareholders arising from the subsidy were greater than the benefits from
reducing free rider problems. 191 Specifically, these commentators
emphasized the extremely low voting support for the proposals and the
small number of "professional gadfly" individual sponsors. Although the
critique of the regime necessarily differed in the 1980s' context of
individual sponsors and low support levels, the policy position is equally
apt today in the quite different landscape of institutions' higher-support-
generating proposals.
In particular, the essential incentive mismatch of the rule identified by
earlier critiques is as relevant for institutional as it is for individual
investors, given the opportunity for fund managers to obtain private
benefits from proposal sponsorship. If institutional sponsors obtain private
benefits, then not only is there even less cause for other shareholders to
subsidize such activity, but also, special cause for concern: such benefits
accrue to the fund manager and not the fund beneficiaries, who are in a
similar position to that of the other shareholders, as they benefit solely
from proposals producing performance improvements. Moreover, the free
rider problem justifying subsidization of individual investor action is
mitigated for institutions given their larger ownership positions and their
participation in trade organizations that assemble detailed information on
governance issues. Finally, the corporate finance literature, which was not
available to 1980s commentators, strongly bolsters the case for altering the
policy of subsidized access to the proxy machinery because it indicates
persuasively that proposal sponsors are frequently not pursuing a value-
maximizing agenda.
Critics of the shareholder proposal regime have advocated repeal of
the entire SEC rule governing proxy proposals. 192 Complete repeal may
well be a worthy ideal, as voting rules are more properly issues of state
corporate law than federal securities law,193 and securities regulation
would be better served by a competitive state regime rather than the
current federal regulatory monopoly.194 But such a reform goes well
191 See, e.g., Dent, Response, supra note 18, at 819, 821 (distinguishing traditional from
anti takeover proposals as not cost-justified); Dent, Study, supra note 18, at 4-8, 14-16; Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259,1279 (1982) (criticizing rule
for cost subsidization); Liebeler, supra note 2, at 447-57.
192 See Dent, Study, supra note 18 (advocating repeal of rule); Liebeler, supra note 2, at 453
(same).
193 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (SEC regulation of
corporate voting rules beyond its authority because a subject matter of state law).
194 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) (advocating comprehensive reform of the federal securities law
by permitting issuers to choose their securities regime, analogous to the choice of corporate charter,
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beyond the immediate problem identified in this Article, which is the
absence of incentives for proposal sponsors, and more specifically, fund
managers to increase the efficacy of their corporate governance activities
within the contours of the existing shareholder proposal regime. This
Article focuses on the one piece of the proxy proposal regime that if
altered would have the greatest impact on institutional activism because it
has the greatest potential incentive effect, the subsidization of shareholder
proposals.
It should be noted that under the SEC proxy proposal rules, proposals
that fail to attain a specified number of votes (under 3% or 10%,
depending on the number of times the proposal was previously submitted)
can be excluded for three years. 195 These threshold vote resubmission
requirements do weed out proposals least likely to improve firm value, but
given the large and growing number of proposals every year on subjects
that have no apparent impact on firm value, they insufficiently address the
institutional investor incentive issues of concern in this Article. Although
the voting threshold for resubmission could be raised even further to a
level closer to that required for voting success, this would not incentivize
activist investors to reevaluate their agenda as well as would reducing the
subsidy for proposals failing to achieve higher voting levels. This is
because an increased threshold requirement can be easily avoided. Activist
investors could simply offer alternative substantive proposals to an
individual firm each year where the threshold was not met, as well as shift
the firm which is the object of their targeting each year, a strategy that
would not be difficult to implement for active public pension funds that
hold shares in hundreds of firms.
The first proposal is elimination of the subsidy, unless the proposal
gains substantial support. Such an approach is consistent with the state-law
approach to the collective action problem: proxy contestants must pay their
own expenses, although shareholders may approve successful challengers'
expenditures ex post.196 The strongest source of support for such a reform
is the fact that the state-law approach to cost recovery has been more
successful than the federal proxy regime in aligning individual
from among the fifty states as well as the SEC or other nations). The present Article underscores the
merit of such an approach: the SEC has not formulated proxy proposal rules that ensure institutional
investors have appropriate incentives in using the process to improve the value of the targeted firm.
193 Rule 14a-8(i)(I2), 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(i)(12) (a company may exclude a proposal that
obtained less than 3% if proposed once within the preceding 5 calendar years, less than 6% if proposed
twice within the preceding 5 calendar years, or less than 10% if proposed 3 or more times within the
preceding 5 calendar years; the term of the exclusion is for 3 calendar years from the last time in which
the proposal was included in the firm's proxy materials).
196 See Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine, 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955). The shareholder
proposal rule is not applicable to proxy fights. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(8) & (9) (2000)
(discussing proposals relating to an election to office and proposals counter to a management proposal
excludable).
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shareholders' incentives with the aggregate interest. In contrast to the
shareholder proposal regime, proxy fights are not devoted to social issues
tangentially related to corporate governance or to inconsequential
structural reforms that have no relation to the profitability of corporate
operations. More importantly, they result in significant improvements in
firm performance while shareholder proposals do not. The superior
outcome from the operation of state law should not be surprising: the
competition across states for corporate charters produces laws that tend to
enhance shareholder welfare, and the absence of competition in the federal
securities regime renders it considerably less responsive to investors'
concerns, and therefore less likely to produce wealth-maximizing rules. 197
Absolute success (50%), the state-law proxy expense reimbursement
standard, need not be the standard for retention of full subsidization of the
proposal. Rather, an appropriate benchmark for success could be 40%, by
analogy to success in the takeover process. Hostile takeovers, which offer
shareholders a substantial premium for tendering, for example, rarely
obtain 100% of outstanding shares, but rather, more typically obtain 75%,
as there are inevitably shareholders who cannot or do not tender their
shares in time; the number of tendered shares rises to over 85% when the
bidder's pre-offer shareholdings are inc1uded.198 A 40% success rate for
proxy proposal reimbursement is therefore roughly equivalent to the
tendering rate in the average successful takeover (that is, it is 80% of
50%).
A 40% support cut-off level for reimbursement is advanced as a
reference point for discussion, with the caveat that too low a
reimbursement threshold will discourage institutions' scrutiny of the
efficacy of their activism, leaving too much room for the sponsorship of
proposals whose private benefits outweigh aggregate gains. 199 An
197 For a discussion of the efficacy of state competition compared to federal law see
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); for a specific analysis
concerning the proxy process see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 81-84 (1991) (noting that federal proxy rules are not entitled to the
same presumption of efficiency as rules firms would adopt themselves under state law).
198 See Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The
Imprisonment of the Free-riding Shareholder, 19 1. FIN. ECON. 283, 301 (1987) (finding that hostile
tender offers for any or all shares obtain on average 75.1 % of outstanding shares, for a total of 87.7%
when average bidder pre-offer holdings are included).
199 Other commentators have considered different benchmarks. For instance, George Dent,
who modified his position favoring repeal of the shareholder proposal rule in the 1990s when
institutions became active on takeover issues, advocates requiring the posting of a bond to cover
corporate costs if a proposal does not garner a respectable level of support, and while he does not
specify a numerical criterion for the proposal, he suggests 20% as one possible minimum. Dent,
Response, supra note 18, at 823. In addition, Bebchuk and Kahan would retain the actual success
(50%) rule for proxy fights, although they suggest, without specifying a concrete number, that a lower
threshold may be appropriate for proxy fights over issues as opposed to board seats. See Bebchuk &
Kahan, supra note 180, at 1122, 1128. They are not, of course, discussing shareholder proposals,
where the costs of the action are much lower and the private benefits, given the parties involved,
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alternative approach that could work as well is a sliding scale of
proportional reimbursement: the successful proponent is fully reimbursed,
and thereafter, the reimbursement rate is proportionate to the votes
received in relation to the votes necessary for success. Thus, the sponsor
whose proposal obtains a 40% vote share does not have free access but
rather, pays 20% ofthe proposal's costs (that is, the reimbursement is 40%
of 50%). However, the sliding scale approach could also incorporate the
40% level of the first (cut-off) approach as the measure of "success" for
free access, and proportionately reduce the subsidy for vote levels below
40%. Under this second approach, a proposal sponsor always receives
some cost subsidization (the subsidy is reduced, but never eliminated
completely).
A relaxed standard of success for proposal reimbursement (less than
40% or the sliding scale approach) would be appropriate despite the
significantly higher threshold at state law for proxy fight expenditure
reimbursement, if the potential private benefits to proponents of
shareholder proposals are far lower than the private benefits realizable to
proxy fight contestants. In such a scenario, the adverse incentive effect of
subsidization due to a divergence in private and social benefits would be
reduced. For example, if private benefits are nonexistent, the proposals
offered would uniformly be expected to increase share value (but we
would also expect such proposals to receive high levels of support). There
is, however, no compelling reason to expect private benefits to be zero in
the shareholder proposal context, particularly given institutions' continued
pursuit of specific proposals despite an absence of any proven performance
effects, the glaring disparity across the types of institutions-public rather
than private funds-that engage in such activity, and the failure of the vast
majority of proposals to receive even close to a majority of the votes.
Accordingly, setting a meaningful threshold for proposal subsidization is
highly desirable.
In addition, to the extent that the social benefits of the proposal are
significant compared to private benefits, more shareholders can be
expected to vote for the proposal. In this regard, establishing a sufficiently
high voting threshold is a means of ensuring the proper private-social
benefit calculation by the proposal sponsor. While the costs of a corporate
governance proposal are not likely to vary with the substance of the
proposal the private benefits may well do so.
The first two approaches to reduce the shareholder proposal subsidy
(whether achieved by a specified cut-off, such as 40%, for obtaining any
reimbursement or through a sliding scale reduction in reimbursement
amount) have the all-or-nothing approach of all SEC rules: they are
qualitatively different.
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mandatory regulations applicable to all issuers. But a third approach,
which I find more attractive, is to permit firms, by shareholder vote, to
choose their proxy proposal regime, opting from among full, partial, or no
subsidy regimes, for all or some proposals or proposal sponsors. Such an
optional approach would, in fact, mesh with the enabling feature of state
corporate law, and in this respect is a more fitting approach for proxy
procedures than a mandatory rule, because the proxy process (voting) is
integrally related to a corporation's internal affairs, the subject matter of
state law, which recognizes the necessity for firms to tailor governance
devices to their particular needs.
It is not at all self-evident that elimination of the subsidy for
shareholder proposals will emerge as the most prevalent choice of issuers
under an optional proposal regime.20o Institutional investors who engage in
corporate activism will not be predisposed to opt for a regime that
eliminates the current subsidy of their activity. However, as activist
shareholders hold only a small proportion of any corporation's stock, they
will need the support of other shareholders to maintain a full subsidization
regime. Hence, the benefit of an optional approach to expenditures on the
proxy proposal process is that the decision to subsidize proposals will be
voluntarily rendered by the firm's stockholders as a group, rather than
imposed upon them by SEC fiat. Of course, the pension fund beneficiaries
who bear the cost of institutional activism that is non-value-maximizing
will not benefit from this approach if the majority of a firm's investors do
not wish to withdraw the subsidy.
None of the alternative reimbursement proposals explicitly requires
management to reimburse the corporation for shareholder proposals it
opposes that are adopted, or for management proposals that are defeated. It
might be desirable to have symmetrical treatment, as there is no reason for
shareholders to incur expenditures by management opposing proposals that
they support, or proposing matters that they do not wish to be
implemented. The potential loss of the screening value of a proposal's
submission compared to private negotiations that could result from a
reduction in proposal activity when proposal sponsors are at risk of loss of
the subsidy will not, however, be offset by symmetrical reimbursement
200 As an alternative to her proposal to repeal the shareholder proposal regime, Susan
Liebeler also proposed that corporations should adopt bylaws imposing minimum ownership
requirements in order to bring proposals before the annual meeting that were greater than the SEC's
minimal threshold requirement, as well as bylaws requiring reimbursement of the cost of proposals.
Liebeler, supra note 2, at 462, 464. She considered these second-best measures to protect corporate
interests while the SEC rule remained on the books. By choosing a bylaw for the reimbursement rule,
in contrast to this article's proposal, Liebeler's proposal would permit management to eliminate the
subsidy without shareholder approval, as managers typically can amend bylaws on their own. See. e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109 (1998) (stating that corporate charter may confer power to adopt, amend
or repeal bylaws on directors). The difference in decision-maker is the reason why, in contrast to the
discussion in the text, Leibeler expects firm-level choice to result in elimination of the subsidy.
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treatment for managers. This is because if managers bear a personal cost
upon their position's defeat, they should be more willing to negotiate over
a proposal's withdrawal (that is, requiring managerial reimbursement
enhances the shareholder-sponsor's bargaining position), regardless of the
manager's quality.
There are two principal reasons not to mandate a symmetrical
requirement of management reimbursement. First, it is impossible to
implement and police such a requirement because any such
reimbursements can be easily covered by increased compensation to the
managers without detection. Second, the rationale for permitting managers
to respond to a shareholder proposal, as well as to submit proposals,
provision of information to shareholders from those better-situated to
identify benefits and costs of specific proposals, cuts against charging
management for losing proposals. The financial risk imposed by a
reimbursement requirement may result in a reduction of the information
management provides shareholders regarding proposals. The reasons for
not mandating a managerial reimbursement requirement are further
arguments in favor of the optional approach to proposal subsidization:
given the tradeoff entailed by a policy of managerial reimbursement, the
appropriate choice may well vary across firms, making it preferable to
permit each firm's investors to choose whether to treat managers and
shareholders symmetrically with regard to the cost ofproposals.
Finally, because the determination of a proposal sponsor's required
reimbursement occurs after the firm has incurred the proposal's
submission costs, there is a problem regarding enforcement of the
proposed reform. Namely, there must be a method of ensuring that a
sponsor of a losing proposal pays the firm the requisite reimbursement
amount. There are, at least, two possible solutions to this problem. One
approach is to require that proposal sponsors post a bond, analogous to
securities-for-expenses statutes in state corporation codes, which require
the plaintiff in a shareholder suit to post a bond to cover defense costs
should the plaintiff 10se?OI The size of the bond would vary according to
which of the three reimbursement schemes were adopted and could vary
based on the substance of the proposal, using as a benchmark the expected
vote given historical voting data across firms by proposal types. A second
approach is to precondition the right to submit a proposal upon the
stockholder's not having outstanding any reimbursement due to a firm
from a losing proposal. This condition would be added to the other
eligibility criteria in rule 14a-8, the continuous ownership of a specified
201 E.g., CAL. CORP. COOS § 800 (West 2001) (stating that at motion of defendant, court
may require plaintiff to post a bond for reasonable expenses, not to exceed $50,000). Dent advanced
such a proposal. See Dent, Response, supra note 18, at 823.
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amount of stock.202
The first approach, posting a bond, has a higher likelihood of
restricting the use of the proposal process by small-resource organizations
and individual investors, compared to the second approach, as they need to
have cash on hand in advance of a proposal's submission. It is thus
probable that it will be subject to greater criticism than the reimbursement
proposal itself for chilling proposals. But it is the preferable approach,
because the second approach creates additional enforcement problems.
In particular, a ban on subsequent proposals would have to apply to
all proposals to be offered at any firm in the future and not simply
proposals at the firm which was not reimbursed. Otherwise, a shareholder
could repeatedly put up losing proposals by choosing a new target, without
ever having to make a reimbursement payment. While the specific firm
that has not been reimbursed by a particular sponsor would be able to
enforce the approach because it knows who has not paid a bill, it would be
no simple task for other firms to determine whether a shareholder proposal
proponent was in default to another firm. The SEC would have to create
and maintain an elaborate national registry for issuers to report delinquent
proposal proponents, and make it accessible to all registrants to track
potential proposal sponsors (or have agency staff enforce the
reimbursement requirement, a costly arrangement).
In addition, the subsequent proposal ban approach may be subject to
abuse due to a sponsor identification problem. Some organizations, most
typically union funds whose members hold shares in their individual
capacity, use individual shareholders to sponsor their proposals. These
organizations would then not be subject to the subsequent prohibition,
even though they had supported losing proposals that were not reimbursed,
because they could continue to engage in activism by finding new
individual sponsors. It would be exceedingly difficult, however, to apply
the subsequent proposal ban to an entity other than the official sponsor of a
losing proposal (the individual in these instances), as it could result in
unwieldy litigation over whether or not a shareholder was acting
independently, and the point of the reform is to rationalize and render
more effective the shareholder proposal regime. Indeed, the precondition
of payment before another proposal can be proffered could generate
additional subjects of litigation, such as, disputes over the assessed cost of
a losing proposal, as payment of the assessed amount determines the right
of the shareholder to engage in subsequent activism. All of these concerns
render the posting of a bond a more cost-effective mechanism than
subsequent proposal prohibition for ensuring that the reform to end the
202 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (2000) (stating that to be eligible to submit a proposal under
rule, proponent must have held continuously at least $2,000 in market value or I% of stock entitled to
vote on proposal, for at least one year by the date of the proposal's submission).
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subsidy has bite-that the sponsors of losing proposals bear their cost.
3. Would Reducing the Shareholder Proposal Subsidy Be
Effective?
Would a shift in the cost of the shareholder proposal regime in fact
create an incentive for institutional investors to engage in a comprehensive
evaluation of their activism programs? The data on corporate expenditures
on shareholder proposals are sketchy and imprecise, but the best and only
available estimate suggests that eliminating the subsidy would have a
salutary incentive effect. The data source of the best estimate is the SEC.
In a 1998 release regarding proposed reforms of the proxy proposal rule,
the SEC indicated that respondents to a 1997 agency-administered
questionnaire reported an average (median) expenditure of approximately
$50,000 ($10,000) on printing, distribution and tabulation costs for
including a shareholder proposal, and $37,000 ($10,000) on the
determination whether to include a proposa1.203
The mean estimates submitted to the SEC imply that eliminating the
subsidization of shareholder proposals would add almost 20% to
CalPERS's current expenditures on its activist program with just one
proposal failure. Such an effect should provide an impetus to the CalPERS
staff to fine-tune its program. Using the lower median cost estimate of
$20,000 instead of the average estimate of $87,000, incentives for the staff
to be more selective regarding proposal sponsorship would be more
attenuated, as it would require CalPERS to incur at least four defeats under
a full subsidy elimination regime to approach the 20% mark.
In actual practice, the impact of the reform on a fund like CalPERS
would be quite variable because its record of success varies considerably:
in 1998, for instance, CalPERS sponsored four proposals, only one of
which obtained more than 40% of the votes, whereas in 1995 it sponsored
203 Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. 240 (1998) (Release No. 34-
40,018) (describing 80 firms reporting on proposal inclusion determination costs and 67 reporting on
printing and other direct costs). The SEC noted that it was unclear whether the responses it received
accounted for more than one proposal. /d. This estimate was one of only three estimates that I could
find. The second estimate was in response to a request for information on the cost of compliance with
the shareholder proposal rules in 1976: the SEC received one estimate, from a firm which reported it
spent $22,450 per included proposal, and $3,740 per excluded proposal, for a total expenditure of over
$150,000 on 16 proposals. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-19,135,47
Fed. Reg. 47,420, 47,424 n.17 (Oct. 14, 1982). Given the absence of a basis to judge the
representativeness of this firm, this estimate is useless. The third estimate I found is in Susan
Liebeler's article proposing repeal of the rule, from an informal survey conducted by the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries (ASCS) in response to proposed changes in the shareholder proposal
rule in 1982: the ASCS reported an average cost of $94,775 per company or $10,275 per proposal.
Liebeler, supra note 2, at 454 n.I57. Even adjusting for inflation, the 1997 SEC survey cost estimate is
much higher (five times) than the 1982 ASCS estimate.
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only two proposals, both of which met the 40% test.204 Thus, under the
first approach with a 40% cutoff for reimbursement, CalPERS's 1998
activism would have cost between 12% to 52% of its activism budget,
depending on whether the median or mean SEC estimate is used as the
reimbursement benchmark, while its 1995 agenda would have had no cost
impact. Under the partial reimbursement of the second proposed approach,
the cost of CalPERS's activism would obviously be less, and hence the
incentive to review that activity seriously would be that much weaker.
Clearly the incentive provided by the proposed reform will depend on
the cost that a losing proposal sponsor must pay, as well as the extent of
the investor's activism program. But unless the investor's demand for
activism is inelastic, a dubious proposition given conventional economic
assumptions, the reform will result in its sponsoring fewer proposals, or
retaining the same number but being more selective concerning which
proposals are submitted, as either approach (full or partial reimbursement)
will raise the cost of activism that does not have broad support across
shareholders. Either adjustment in fund behavior will have a similar
outcome: there will be fewer instances oflow-vote-attracting proposals.
For a more comprehensive perspective on the costs of the shareholder
proposal process of the proposed reforms, the effect of the proposed
subsidy reduction can be estimated for shareholder proposals submitted in
1997 and 1998. The IRRC reported the voting results for 254 of 255
shareholder proposals on corporate governance submitted to 175 firms in
1998, and for 283 proposals submitted to 179 firms in 1997?OS The
absolute number of proposals receiving over 50% of the votes cast is about
the same in the two years, 32 and 31, respectively, and an additional 26
(28) proposals in 1998 (1997) received at least 40% of the votes, the
proposed cutoff for sponsors' full reimbursement. Thus, a 40% cutoff
would result in reimbursement of 23% of the 1998 submitted proposals
(21 % of 1997 proposals). The average level of support was 26% in 1998
and 24% in 1997, an increase of 2%, similar to the annual increase in
support for shareholder proposals on defensive tactics reported by
organizations collecting voting data, such as the IRRC and the proxy
solicitation firm, Georgeson & Company.206 The medians reveal a similar
204 IRRC, Checklist of 1998 u.s. Corporate Governance Shareholder Proposals, IRRC
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 27-32 (Apr.-June 1998); IRRC, Checklist of 1995 Shareholder
Proposals, IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 24-33 (July-Sept. 1995). In recent years
CalPERS has significantly cut back on the number of proposals it has submitted for a vote, although it
still targets a dozen firms. Paul Sweeney, Clash by Proxy, ACROSS THE BOARD, May 1996, at 21, 25
(noting that in 1995, CalPERS fund pushed for vote on only 2 proposals of 10 firms contacted with
resolutions, and expects to file proposals at only 3 or 4 meetings in 1996). Elimination of the cost
subsidization rule undoubtedly will reinforce this trend.
205 IRRC, Corporate Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1997 (1998); IRRC, Corporate
Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1998 (1999).
206 GEORGESON & COMPANY, INC., 1998 ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP CORPORATE
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increase, 20.3% in 1997 compared to 23% in 1998. Thus a 20% vote cutoff
for subsidization would cover half of the proposals submitted in these two
years. The bottom quartile of the distribution of votes on shareholder
proposals in 1998 (1997) consists of proposals with less than 10% (9%) of
the votes cast.
The cost of the shareholder proposal regime, using the SEC estimates
for the 1998 data, is indicated in Table 3 in the 0% cutoff row in the table
(the current regime subsidizes all proposals), as is the cost of a reformed
regime under a variety of vote cutoff leve1s,z°7 As the table indicates, the
cost is non-trivial from the point of view of individual proposal sponsors
who would otherwise be paying these amounts, but not when compared to
the aggregate market value of publicly traded firms. To determine the
subsidy for proposals not attracting a majority, the 50% cutoff row
estimates are subtracted from those in the 0% cutoff row; this provides an
estimate of $22 million in 1997 and $19 million in 1998, using the SEC's
mean estimate of $87,000 in corporate expenditures per proposal, for an
average over the two years of nearly $21 million. Averaging over the two
years, the subsidy ranges from $18 million to $7 million, for a vote cutoff
of 40% and 10% respectively (which approximate the top and lower
quarti1es of the distribution of votes cast).208 Another way to express this
result is that elimination of the subsidy for proposals that fail to obtain
40% of the votes would save targeted firms $18 million annually.
GOVERNANCE 7 (1998) (showing in graph of votes for poison pi11 proposals from 1987 through 1999,
steady increase in support from 20% to 45%); IRRC, Voting on U.S. Governance Shareholder
Resolutions, IRRC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BULLETIN 3 (Apr.-June 1998) (indicating increasing
support levels for poison pi11 and staggered board proposals in 1998 compared to 1997 proxy votes).
207 The table uses votes as a percentage of votes cast to classify proposals. For less than 10%
of the corporate governance proposals reported in the data sources cited in note 203, supra, the
company specified a different voting requirement in its proxy statement. As a result, the cutoff
assigned in Table 3 to 21 corporate governance proposals in 1997 and 22 in 1998 would be lower,
using the firms' vote tally. Thus, the figures in the text underestimate the cost of the regime if one were
to use as the cutoff percentage the vote necessary for a proposal's passage rather than the percentage of
votes cast.
208 The subsidy for a 40% cutoff is determined by subtracting the amount in the 40% row
from the amount in the 0% row; similarly, the subsidy for a 10% cutoff is determined by subtracting
the amount in the 10% row from the amount in the 0% row.
209 E.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978) (majority cannot ratify waste
of assets); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine, 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955) (limitation of proxy fight
expenditure reimbursement). Although managers can 'spend corporate assets on charitable
contributions without shareholder approval, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145,98 A.2d 581,
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), consistent with corporate law's centralization in management
of decision-making that does not involve fundamental corporate changes, this nonmajoritarian context
is not a relevant benchmark because management is not the source of the decision to subsidize
shareholder proposals. The SEC's proxy regime is one of the only instances in which an allocation of
corporate assets is determined by individual shareholders without a need to obtain the support of at
least a majority of the owners. The only other instance is derivative lawsuits, but in that context, the
minority shareholder's ability to expend corporate resources on the litigation is greatly restricted by
state courts.
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TABLE 3. ESTIMATED COST OF SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSAL REGIME 1997-98
PANEL A: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROPOSALS
No. No. Subsidy extent Subsidy extent
proposals proposals ($mill.) 1997 ($rnill.) 1998
1997 1998
31 32 $2.7 ($.6) $2.8 ($.6)
59 58 $5 ($1.2) $5 ($1.2)
94 91 $8.2 ($1.9) $7.9 ($1.8)
142 141 $12.4 ($2.8) $12.3 ($2.8)
196 188 $17.1 ($3.9) $16.4 ($3.8)
283 254 $24.6 ($5.7) $22.1 ($5.1)
PANEL B. SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PROPOSALS
Vote cutoff No. No. Subsidy extent Subsidy extent
for subsidy proposals proposals ($mill.) 1997 ($rnill.) 1998
1997 1998
50% 0 0 0 0
40% 0 0 0 0
30% 0 0 $.09 ($.02)
20% 0 2 0 $.2 ($.04)
10% 14 16 $1.2 ($0.3) $1.4 ($0.3)
0% 95 104 $8.3 ($1.9) $9.1 ($2.1)
Data Sources: IRRC, Corporate Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1997 (1998); IRRC,
Corporate Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1998 (1999); IRRC, SOCIAL POLlCY SHAREHOLDER
RESOLUTIONS IN 1997: ISSUES, VOTES AND VIEWS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Jan. 1998); and
IRRC, SOCIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER RESOLUTIONS IN 1998: ISSUES, VOTES AND VIEWS OF
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Jan. 1999). Proposals covered by both IRRC services are included in
panel A, corporate governance proposals. Average cost estimates per proposal of $87,000 (median cost
estimate per proposal of $20,000) were obtained from a survey of issuers by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, reported in Amendments to Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-
40,018,63 Fed. Reg. 29,106,29,114 (May 28, 1998).
Although this Article is directed at corporate governance proposals,
the proposed reduction in the subsidy for shareholder proposals should be
applied across-the-board, to social responsibility as well as corporate
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governance proposals. There are two reasons for doing this. First, it is
sometimes difficult to classify a proposal: the TIAA-CREF proposals to
diversify the composition of boards, for instance, can be considered to fall
into either category, as can proposals to link executive compensation to
multipliers of employee compensation or social performance criteria. If the
subsidy varied by category, it would encourage proponents to reword
corporate governance proposals in order to be classified as social
responsibility proposals, which could result in the submission of proposals
even more poorly suited to improve performance than current proposals.
Second, and more important, the SEC's inclusion of such shareholder
proposals perversely stands corporate law on its head, because it permits a
minority of shareholders to dictate the expenditure of corporate funds for
non-profit-maximizing uses when core principles of corporate law require
unanimity for waste of assets, and prohibit reimbursement of proxy
expenses for contests undertaken for personal reasons,z1O
The estimate of the cost of the shareholder proposal regime is greater
when social responsibility proposals are included in the calculation:
although fewer in number than corporate governance proposals, these
proposals receive far lower levels of support. The second panel in Table 3
contains a parallel calculation of the cost of the subsidy for social
responsibility proposals submitted in 1997 and 1998.211 As no such
proposal received a majority of the votes, the subsidy for proposals not
attracting a majority is simply the estimate in the 0% cutoff row, $9.1
million in 1998 and $8.3 million in 1997, respectively, using, as before,
the SEC's mean proposal expenditure estimate of $87,000. Combining the
estimated cost of these proposals with that of the corporate governance
210 E.g., Schreiber v. Bryan, 396 A.2d 512, 518 (Del. Ch. 1978) (majority cannot ratify waste
of assets); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine, 128 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1955) (limitation of proxy fight
expenditure reimbursement). Although managers can spend corporate assets on charitable
contributions without shareholder approval, A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145,98 A.2d 581,
appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953), consistent with corporate law's centralization in management
of decision-making that does not involve fundamental corporate changes, this nonmajoritarian context
is not a relevant benchmark because management is not the source of the decision to subsidize
shareholder proposals. The SEC's proxy regime is one of the only instances in which an allocation of
corporate assets is determined by individual shareholders without a need to obtain the support of at
least a majority of the owners. The only other instance is derivative lawsuits, but in that context, the
minority shareholder's ability to expend corporate resources on the litigation is greatly restricted by
state courts.
211 Voting results on social responsibility proposals were obtained from IRRC, SOCIAL
POLICY SHAREHOLDER REsOLUTIONS IN 1997: ISSUES, VOTES AND VIEWS OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS (Jan. 1998) (hereinafter IRRC, SOCIAL 1997) and IRRC, SOCIAL POLICY SHAREHOLDER
REsOLUTIONS IN 1998: ISSUES, VOTES AND VIEWS OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Jan. 1999). Where
a proposal is an overlap-that is, where it is tracked by both IRRC services-it is counted as a corporate
governance proposal (there were 20 overlaps in 1997, and 17 in 1998). The withdrawal and omission
rate for the social responsibility proposals is high: including overlapping proposals, by my count, of
299 initial social responsibility proposals in 1997, 115 came to a vote, and in 1998,121 of293 tracked
proposals came to a vote.
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proposals, using a voting cutoff of either 40% or 10% and averaging the
cost over the two years, results in an estimated cost savings that ranges
from $27 million to $14 million.
As this calculation, shown in Table 3, indicates, the proposed
elimination or reduction of the subsidy of shareholder proposals should
have a much greater impact on social responsibility proposals than
corporate governance proposals because such proposals receive much
lower levels of support. But this would be a felicitous outcome from the
viewpoint of corporate law as social responsibility proposals are not
directed at maximizing share value, which is the aim of corporate law. In
this context, an additional attractive benefit of the third reform option,
shareholder selection of the proposal regime, is that it returns the proxy
process to the corporate law decision-making norm, whereby the minority
is bound by the majority,212 as a majority of the shareholders would choose
the extent of the subsidization of shareholder proposals. In short, it, as well
as the alternative proposed reforms, would put an end to what has been an
egregious abuse of the proxy process.
The average cost per firm in 1998 of corporate governance proposals
is approximately $126,000, and in 1997, it is $140,000. The 1998 average
cost falls to $110,000 and $97,000 if proposals obtaining 50% and 40% of
the votes, respectively, are excluded. The comparable figures for 1997 are
$123,000 and $109,000 respectively. But as two-thirds of the firms
received only one corporate governance proposal in each year, their
estimated expenditure is $87,000. To understand the robustness of these
figures, we need to consider the distribution of proposals obtaining a
majority of the votes, as these proposals should be subsidized by the
regime. The distribution of corporate governance proposals across firms by
year and voting support is reported in Table 4.213 Of the firms receiving
only one corporate governance proposal, in both years, 13 firms' proposals
obtained a majority of the votes cast. Of the firms experiencing multiple
corporate governance proposals, over the two years, the proposals of only
three firms all obtained over 50% of the votes (eight proposals). For most
of the firms receiving more than one proposal, no proposal obtained 50%
of the votes (55 of 67 such firms in 1997 and 39 of 55 in 1998). This
means that the cost of the regime to multiple proposal firms is much higher
than the estimated average, reaching as high as $435,000 for the two firms
212 For example, fundamental changes to the corporate form require the vote of at least a
majority of the shareholders. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 242,251,271 (1998) (holding that majority
stockholder vote required for charter amendment, merger, and sale of assets).
213 The Article does not undertake a similar calculation for social responsibility proposals
because they are not the focus of concern of this article and they appear to be slightly less clustered
across target firms than corporate governance proposals. For example, in 1997, of 74 firms voting on
such proposals, 55 or 74% voted on only one proposal, and only two (3%) voted on more than two
proposals. IRRC SOCIAL 1997, supra note 208, at 77-84.
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in 1998 with five proposals, and $348,000 for two firms with four
proposals in 1997, none of which obtained 50% of the votes.
TABLE 4. DISTRIBUTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROPOSALS BY FIRM AND VOTING SUPPORT 1997-98
No. of No. of No. firms with No. of No. firms with
proposals firms 50% (40%) firms 50% (40%)
1997 proposals 1997 1998 proposals 1998
1 112 13 (14) 120 13 (9)
2 40 4 (7) 38 14 (8)'
3 21 6 (1)' 11 1 (5)
4 2 1 (3) 4 1 (1)
5 4 1 (0) 2 0(0)
Notes: The columns "No. firms with 50% (40%)" indicate the number of firms where a proposal
obtained at least 50% (between 40-49%) of the votes cast, of the firms receiving the number of
proposals indicated in the cell's row in the year indicated in the cell's column.
indicates a cell in which one firm has been counted more than once (in both the 50% and 40% entries)
because it received one proposal that obtained 50% and one that obtained between 40%-49% of the
votes cast.
Data Sources: IRRC, Corporate Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1997 (1998); IRRC,
Corporate Governance Service, VOTING RESULTS 1998 (1999).
The distribution pattern is similar if the vote cutoff is 40%: while nine
(14) more single proposal and 13 (11) more multiple proposal firms meet
this criterion in 1998 (1997), again, most of the additional multiple
proposal firms had only one proposal that obtained over 40% of the votes
(10 in 1998 and nine in 1997). Of course, the cost estimates are
conservative because none of the estimates, whether by firm or in the
aggregate, include the resources expended by firms on omitted proposals
(proposals excluded for failing to meet the SEC's criteria for
submission).214 Yet the resources spent on omitted proposals-the
expenditure on determining whether to include a proposal-are
approximately equal to the additional expenditure on those that are
included-the mailing and distribution costs (SEC estimates of a mean of
$37,000 compared to $50,000, and of identical medians of $10,000).215
From this perspective, all of the cost figures presented considerably
214 Nor are expenditures on withdrawn proposals (proposals for which the firm and sponsor
negotiated an agreement resulting in the proposal's withdrawal) included. How many of these
proposals would have received a substantial proportion of votes is unknown. While we might expect
management to reach a negotiated settlement only on proposals that it deems likely to obtain a high
level of support, the negative performance associated with such compromises in recent years reported
by the Chidambaran and Woidtke study cautions that this may not be the case. Chidambaran &
Woidtke, supra note 8.
215 Supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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underestimate the cost of the regime.
The cost estimates in Table 3, even if refined to reflect the actual
distribution of proposals across firms, do not impose a heavy burden on
shareholders who are subsidizing proposal sponsors and voting against the
proposals. But even seemingly low annual expenditures add up: the
present value of the cost of the regime is, at a minimum, $315 million,
using the historical market risk premium of 9.2% as the capitalization
rate.216 This is a minimum because there is considerable debate over
whether this is an accurate estimate of the equity risk premium: it was
significantly lower in the nineteenth century and beginning of the
twentieth century,217 and many financial economists predict a lower
premium in the future.218 Using as the capitalization rate, for example, the
average risk premium from either 1802-1870 or 1871-1925, 1.4% and
4.4% respectively, or the overall average premium of 5.1% from 1802-
1997,219 the subsidy of shareholder proposals under the current regime is
$2.1 billion, $659 million or $569 million. The savings to firms from
eliminating the subsidy for shareholder proposals that fail to receive at
least 40% of the votes ranges, across the differing historical capitalization
rates, from $1.9 billion to $293 million. These sums are not trivial.
Moreover, the estimates are conservatively biased because they assume
there will be no growth in the number of proposals presented, although the
number has increased over time.
Some might contend that because the cost estimates are quite modest
compared to the market value of publicly-traded firms, it is unnecessary to
rein in the subsidy as the problem is self-correcting: informed funds can be
expected to revise their activist strategies in the face of the new learning of
the finance literature. In this view, it is better for shareholders to bear the
relatively low cost of the subsidy during an adjustment period in which
institutions reassess their activist programs, than for them to operate under
a reformed regime that reduced the subsidy. There are two rationales that
could be advanced in support of this position. First, a reduction in the
subsidy could undermine whatever deterrent effect is provided by
216 See. e.g., STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 227-28 (5th ed. 1999) (stating
that equity risk premium averaged 9.2% from 1926 to 1997). The present value of a perpetuity is the
annual cash flow divided by the capitalization rate. [d. at 120. The numerator used for this calculation
is the average over 1997 and 1998 of the cost of corporate governance and social responsibility
proposals that did not obtain a majority of votes (the estimates in the 50% cutoff row subtracted from
those in the 0% cutoff row in Table 3), or $29 million. If the proposed 40% cutoff for full
reimbursement were adopted, the numerator would be $27 million.
217 [d. at 228 (stating that risk premium averaged 1.4% from 1802-1870 and 4.4% from
1871-1925). .
218 E.g., BRADFORD CORNELL, THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 200 (1999) (reasonable forward-
looking range for risk premium of 5% to 7%). The capitalized cost using this rate range is from $580
million to $414 million.
219 Ross ET AL., supra note 216, at 228.
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shareholder proposals, and second, it could decrease the extent of
governance innovations that arise from institutional investors'
experimentation with governance reforms through proposal sponsorship,
as they would no longer be able to offer, at no cost to themselves,
proposals that take several years of submission before they achieve
substantial support.
These objections to the need for reform are not, however, persuasive.
A significant deterrent effect is improbable because of the lack of any
performance effect from, and the infrequency of top management turnover
after, proposal submissions. In addition, the experimentation aspect of
shareholder proposals is attenuated: the governance proposals offered by
institutional investors have not been directed at novel devices for which
there have been no empirical research on performance effects. For
example, the drive to propose independent directors in the 1990s occurred
after most firms' boards had a majority of outside directors and substantial
research had been undertaken regarding their impact, and the defensive
tactics that were the object of the initiation of shareholder proposals had
been the subject of prior empirical study, although the performance effect
of defenses has been found to differ over time, which has changed the
calculus concerning the efficacy of shareholder targeting of them. But
experimentation over governance reforms will not be eliminated by a
reduction in the subsidy-it will instead require a higher threshold for
action.
Most important, the premise of the contention, that activist
institutions will significantly alter their governance programs as the results
of the finance literature are publicized, is dubious. The disparity in
proposal sponsorship across public and private fund managers strongly
suggests that there is an agency problem, so that the regime will not, in
fact, be subject to self-correction. The current regime provides no
incentive to mitigate an agency problem in institutional proposal
sponsorship. Instead, it encourages the submission of proposals that have
private benefits and hence may not be value-maximizing, by allocating
proposal costs across all shareholders. Accordingly, the more compelling
response to the current regime's relatively low annual cost compared to
market capitalization is to recognize that the low cost is a contributing
factor to the tolerance of a wasteful regime.
Although the case is exceedingly strong for reducing, if not for
eliminating, the subsidization of shareholder proposals, in all likelihood,
such a reform of the proxy proposal process will be politically difficult to
implement. It is improbable that politically well-connected institutions
(public pension funds and unions) which have been obtaining access to the
proxy process for free will voluntarily agree to begin paying for it. Indeed,
institutional investors have opposed even minor changes that could limit
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their free access to the proxy process, such as an increase in the minimum
threshold of votes required for a proposal's resubmission in a subsequent
year.220 It is, however, hoped that this Article's marshaling of the evidence
and analysis of the dismal ineffectiveness of the institutional investor
activism agenda will alter the view of those investors (or at least of
nonactivist institutional investors) of the proposal process such that they
will acknowledge, and support, the need for meaningful reform.
Conclusion
Shareholder proposals, although an increasingly prominent feature of
institutional investor corporate governance activism since the mid-1980s,
have not had a significant impact on firm performance. The most plausible
explanation for the absence of a discernible positive effect has been large
scale misdirection in the form that such activism has taken: many
proposals have focused on reforming board composition and structure and
limiting executive compensation, yet empirical studies of such reforms
consistently indicate that they do not improve performance. In addition,
proposals to implement confidential voting also provide no benefit because
the procedural change does not significantly alter voting outcomes.
Finally, proposals to remove takeover defenses need to be directed at firms
where they will do the most good, such as those with insider-controlled
boards, yet proposal sponsors often lack the knowledge of specific firm
characteristics to engage in precision targeting, diminishing the likelihood
that the proposal will improve performance.
Although submitting a proposal is not as expensive as other forms of
shareholder activism, such as waging a proxy fight, the lackluster results
of such activity suggest that institutional investors should implement
greater internal controls to monitor their corporate governance programs,
redirecting the resources expended on activism to their highest valued use.
Adoption of industry-wide good practice standards for corporate
governance programs and third-party certification of the internal review
process would spur individual funds to undertake careful and
comprehensive reviews of their activism programs.
Fund managers' incentives to engage in ongoing scrutiny of their
governance programs would further be enhanced were the federal rules for
shareholder proposals revised to require proposal sponsors either to incur
the full cost of a losing proposal or a substantial part of the cost, or, better
still, to permit firms by a shareholder vote to select their proposal
subsidization regime. By increasing the probability that institutional efforts
220 See SEC Finalizes Changes to Shareholder Proposal Rules, 69 ASPEN LAW & BUSINESS
CORPORAlION 13, at 13 (July 1, 1998).
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at corporate governance actIvIsm will improve targeted firms' share
values, these recommendations will not only benefit all targeted firm
shareholders but will also encourage fund boards to perform more
attentively their fiduciary obligations to fund beneficiaries.
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